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The central question addressed in this working paper is whether and how the poor and 
disadvantaged in Central and East Sumba have access to redress mechanisms when the land that 
they cultivate or live on becomes contested.  Criteria for ‘being disadvantaged’ include poverty in 
an economic sense, but also low position in the social hierarchy, and criteria related to ethnicity, 
education, and other forms of social and cultural capital. The dominant normative framework in 
Sumba is customary law (adat). Clan chiefs have the largest say in decision-making on how 
natural resources are allocated and distributed, but there is not always consensus on who is the 
legitimate chief. Moreover, state law provides alternative rules for justice seekers in dealing with 
land and addressing labour issues. The paper presents an analysis of the current adat-dominated 
system of land governance, in which elements of state law are integrated. We look at how this 
hybrid system functions in practice, because it is in this context that land disputes occur and are 
resolved. Ten smaller empirical examples provide insight into everyday implementation of law in 
relation to land. Two recent cases in which large plantations are being established on Sumba – 
where large scale commercial agriculture is just in planning or starting phase – indicate how this 
hybrid legal system functions in response to agrarian change. A third case involving contested 
mining activities indicates how power differences can block access to justice. Millar and Sarat’s 
dispute resolution pyramid provides a useful explanation of how Sumbanese use redress 
mechanisms, but choice of mechanism does not depend on the type of dispute only. In line with 
the ‘forms of capital’ model for explaining differences in power (or disadvantage), it appears that 
available forums of redress are only accessible for justice seekers with a sufficient amount of 
economic, social and cultural capital. 
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1. Introduction 
This working paper presents the results of a case study on Sumba (in the province Nusa Tenggara 
Timur) regarding access to justice for the poor and disadvantaged who are involved in disputes or 
conflicts concerning land. Since land is the main source of livelihood for over two-thirds of the 
population in Sumba, losing access to gardens and rice fields is a big problem. Disputes over land 
have always been common and frequent on the island, amongst neighbours and between 
neighbouring communities. Yet, several recent developments have increased the competition over 
land, changing the character of disputes and possibly the way they are solved. Firstly, agribusiness 
companies have been entering the area in search of thousands of hectares of uncultivated land that 
they can convert into plantations. Secondly, recent administrative developments, in particular the 
creation of new districts in the context of decentralization (pemekaran), have stimulated 
development of the local land market. There is a growing demand for land for housing and offices in 
and around administrative centres, and government officials and their relatives as well as 
entrepreneurs have started to buy land from farmers, not only for housing but also for growing rice 
on their own paddy fields, or speculating on further developments. 
Compared with East Java, which is the focus for other case studies in this series, Sumba is a 
new area for large scale agro-industrial exploitation. There is no long-standing history of dealing with 
plantation labour issues, nor with involving local farmers in agro industrial enterprises. The initial 
negotiations now taking place between plantation companies, district governments and local 
populations reveal an encounter between different normative systems. While land governance used 
to be a matter for customary practices and rules, state law is now gaining importance. In practice, 
Sumbanese deploy strategies to integrate elements of the state legal system in their customary land 
law system when they believe it will bring them a beneficial result.  
 
This paper’s central question is whether and how the poor and disadvantaged in Central and East 
Sumba have access to redress mechanisms when the land that they cultivate or live on becomes 
contested. First, we had to find out who these poor and disadvantaged are, which normative 
frameworks shape their access to justice regarding land issues, which redress mechanisms are 
available to them, and which categories of justice seekers are able to access which redress 
mechanisms? The answers to these questions describe the context in which new plantation 
developments have occurred.  Second, we tried to find out how the poor and disadvantaged are 
affected by land grabbing and how they have access to redress mechanisms in those situations.  
The paper starts by identifying, in Section 2, the ‘poor’ and ‘disadvantaged’ in rural Sumba 
and the problems they experience (which we refer to as ‘real life problems’) in relation to land. 
Statistics show that the proportion of poor people in Sumba is much higher than in other areas in 
Indonesia. Internal criteria, based on traditional stratification according to class, generation and 
gender, provide greater differentiation. The real life problems of those who are at the bottom of this 
traditional hierarchy concern basic survival: food, shelter and health. The definition of poverty 
applied in this section emphasises local indicators of poverty and disadvantage, showing that those 
who belong to the lowest social strata, and those who rely on subsistence agriculture for their 
livelihood, have the weakest voice in decision making concerning land use and the distribution of 
benefits from development. Among these, ethnic minorities, youth and women are in the worst 
position. 
Section 3 addresses the normative frameworks that shape access to justice regarding land 
issues. In rural Sumba, the most important legal system is customary law or adat. Discussion of adat 
in academic literature often relates to the experience of indigenous people whose rights – especially 
rights relating to culture and land – are threatened by outside forces.
1
 As a minority within a larger 
administrative polity, indigenous people often play the role of a disadvantaged party facing a more 
powerful outside party, which is usually supported by the state. This debate concentrates on how the 
                                                
1 Jamie Davidson and David Henley (eds) (2007), The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The 
Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
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rights of the indigenous community can be protected2 and whether or how the community’s rights 
can be recognized within the statutory system.
3
 However, the Sumba case is different. The natural 
boundaries of the island coincide with the territory of the Sumbanese people, who can be seen as 
composing one adat community (masyarakat adat). Land conflicts on Sumba do not fit the national 
Indonesian typology of an indigenous community versus outsiders, but rather concern the internal 
dynamics of Sumba’s customary legal system. Of course, Sumba is not isolated from the nation-state, 
and therefore Indonesia statutory law also applies. Section 3 analyses customary land law and 
dispute resolution in Sumba, and goes on to examine how and in which situations state law or state 
institutions are used in disputes concerning land.  
The box inserts in this paper serve to illustrate how customary rules and procedures, or 
combinations of customary and state law, affect or protect the disadvantaged in cases concerning 
land. They also demonstrate the dilemma of normative pluralism: where people living in customary 
communities are aware of the alternatives to their own customary norms, and believe that applying 
those alternatives would improve their own situation. 
Section 4 considers recent developments which have led to further commoditization of land. 
The section includes two cases concerning plantations: the first involving negotiations between the 
local population, the district government and a biofuel company in Central Sumba; and the second 
involving a cotton and maize plantation in East Sumba on idle but privately owned land. The section 
includes a third case concerning contested mining activities in the forest interior of East Sumba, for 
indicating how local population, who experienced the mining company threatened their livelihood, 
sought access to redress mechanisms. Two rather alarming conclusions arising out of these cases are 
that the process of accessing justice did not appear to progress further than the phase of voicing 
grievances, and that poor and disadvantaged people are not involved at all in the initial negotiating 
with plantation companies.  
If justice seekers do not progress beyond voicing their grievances, does that indicate a lack of 
mechanisms for redress? Section 5 describes which forums of redress are available in Sumba, and 
how they have been used in the resolution of land conflicts.  The main conclusion is that land 
problems are usually resolved through traditional negotiating methods (secara keluarga), in which 
the poor have very little power. For those who can afford it, dispute resolution through the local 
government – from the village head up to the district head – is becoming more popular as a forum in 
which to appeal an adverse result obtained through the adat system. Political actors, religious 
authorities and other brokers between the population and companies have a mitigating or mediating 
role. Only a tiny proportion of land disputes are brought before a court, and these typically include 
criminal cases (murder because of a land dispute), or involve local elite or wealthy businessmen as 
plaintiff. 
In summary, it is possible to conclude that the poor and disadvantaged will be able to 
improve their access to the land they rely on for their livelihood if their negotiating power in disputes 
increases, and if a land law system is applied that includes the option for all individuals to get access 
to land. The findings in this case study do not support policies aimed at strengthening customary law 
regarding land in general, since many customary rules discriminate against women, those of lower 
class, youth and migrants.  
 
 
2. The poor and disadvantaged in Sumba and their real life problems 
 
Any ethnographic study within this Access to Justice research program begins by asking who should 
be defined as ‘poor’ or ‘disadvantaged’, because the answer defines the characteristics of the justice 
                                                
2 Sandra Moniaga (2007), From Bumiputera to masyarakat adat: a long and confusing journey. In The Revival 
of Tradition in Indonesian Politics, Jamie Davidson and David Henley (eds). London: RoutledgeCurzon. pp. 275-
94. 
3 Kurnia Toha (2007). The struggle over land rights; A study of indigenous property rights in Indonesia. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan. 
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seekers who are central in this program. The question can be answered in several ways in this study 
about Sumba. The purely statistical answer defines ‘poor and disadvantaged’ by reference to a 
number of different statistical measures. However, this answer does not account for the internal 
social differentiators that prevail in Sumba. Therefore, this section considers Sumba’s customary 
social stratification, revealing that ‘being disadvantaged’ has many dimensions.  These are analysed 
using Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of forms of capital.
4
 
 
2.1 Measuring poverty 
Several institutions publish statistics on poverty levels in Sumba.  Results differs according to 
measurement methods and various criteria, such as per capita gross domestic product.5 Table 1 
presents some statistical data that clearly indicates that Sumba is very poor compared with other 
areas of Indonesia, with a vast majority of the population depending upon agriculture for their 
livelihood. For comparison, similar data for the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur,
6
 and for Indonesia 
as a whole are included. 
Table 1.  Population and poverty levels in Sumba, compared with the province Nusa Tenggara 
Timur (NTT), and Indonesia as a whole.
7
 
 West 
8
Sumba 
East 
Sumba 
Nusa Tenggara 
Timur (NTT) 
 
Indonesia 
Population in 2005 404,000 206,000 4,260,000 219,205,000 
Surface area, in km
2
 4,051 7,000 49,880 1,919,317 
2005 Gross Domestic 
Product, Per Capita 
(in US dollars
9
) 
$239 $368 
 
$360 
 
$1,320 
 
2002 UNDP 
Human Development 
Index Ranking
10
 
(scale from 1 = best) 
339 
(out of 
341 
districts) 
329 
(out of 
341 
districts) 
30  
(out of 30 
provinces) 
108 
(out of 177 countries 
worldwide) 
Percentage of the working 
population engaged in 
agriculture as the main 
economic activity (tani) 
87 
(in 2002) 
84  
(in 2002) 
78  (in 2005)
11
 44 (in 2005)
12
 
 
 
                                                
4 Pierre Bourdieu (1986), The Forms of Capital. In Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of 
Education [1983], John G. Richerdson (ed.). New York: Greenwood Press. pp. 241-259. 
5 See Friedhelm Betke and Hamonangan Ritonga (2004), Developing a local-specific approach to poverty 
monitoring in rural East Indonesia: who are the poor in East Sumba? In Poverty Monitoring in Asia, Hand 
Gsänger and Miryam Fernando (eds). Colombo: Center for Poverty Analysis. pp. 117-46. See 
http://www.cepa.lk/uploads/pubs/poverty%20monitoring%20in%20asia.pdf#page=126 (last accessed on May 
19, 2009). 
6 The province which consists of Indonesia’s South-Eastern islands, including Sumba, Timor and Flores. 
7 BPS Statistics Indonesia, see www.bps.go.id/ and http://ntt.bps.go.id (last accessed on March 13, 2009); 
BPS-Statistics Indonesia, BAPPENAS and UNDP National Human Development Report 2004: The Economics of 
Democracy: Financing Human development in Indonesia, see http://www.undp.or.id/pubs/ihdr2004/ihdr2004_ 
full.pdf (last accessed on March 13, 2009); and the CIA’s world fact book, see https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html (last accessed on March 13, 2009). 
8 Until May 2007 Sumba was administratively divided in two districts, West Sumba and East Sumba. Central 
Sumba was part of West Sumba. 
9 For comparative purposes, the income figures are given in US dollars, using an exchange rate of 1 US $ = Rp. 
9,000. 
10
 The HDI combines indicators on life expectancy, education and income. UNDP National Human Development 
Report 2004, p. 208.  
11 http://ntt.bps.go.id/mploy/mp02.htm (last accessed August 13, 2007). 
12 http://www.bps.go.id/sector/employ/table2.shtml (last accessed August 13, 2007). 
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The general conclusion that may be drawn from Table 1 above is that, on a variety of statistical 
measures, a high proportion of people in Sumba would qualify as ‘poor’. Of all the Indonesian 
districts, East and West Sumba are at the very bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI) 
ranking, which measures life expectancy, education and income. The high percentage of people in 
Sumba who rely on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood is also an indication of poverty.  
Given that almost the entire Sumbanese population could be classified as poor, we must be 
more precise as to who, within this society, we label as the ‘poorest’ and ‘most disadvantaged’. One 
of our research questions was therefore to discover internal  criteria of poverty and disadvantage 
that apply within Sumba. Box 3 provides an example from one Sumbanese village. 
 
Box 1.  Internal criteria for poverty and disadvantage 
One village secretary explained about the criteria used in his village to decide who is eligible for a 
government programme to provide financial compensation in respect of fuel price rises (BLT, 
Bantuan Langsung Tunai). Nearly all the people in the village depended on agriculture for their 
livelihood. Most did not have regular cash income, and what they earned was not registered 
anywhere. Since they were subsistence farmers the larger part of their agricultural produce never 
entered the market but was used for their own consumption. In the absence of the usual statistical 
criteria, the village administration decided to assess the villagers’ relative wealth in terms of 
material assets: people who owned more than one head of livestock (buffalo, horses or cattle), a 
motorcycle or a car, a television set with parabola antenna, or a permanent house built with stone 
walls and tiles, could not enter the government programme.  
 
While practical and easy to apply, these are relatively subjective criteria of welfare.  They reveal only 
economic wealth, and only for households as a whole. If we interpret ‘being poor’ in the broader 
sense of ‘being poor and disadvantaged’, we must also consider non-economic criteria and intra 
household distinctions. An "emic" definition of being disadvantaged  is in terms that are meaningful 
(consciously or unconsciously) to the actor, and comes from within the culture. In Sumba, being 
‘disadvantaged’ can be defined as belonging to the lower strata of society. The next section provides 
background information on Sumbanese society and its stratification, and assists us to understand the 
importance of land and the way in which this essential resource was traditionally governed and 
distributed. 
 
2.2 Sumbanese criteria for being disadvantaged  
Sumba has a hierarchical society. This creates a fundamental problem in addressing questions of 
access to justice, since that concept is associated with equality before the law.  Likewise, social 
justice relies upon equality amongst individuals. By examining the criteria on which this hierarchy is 
based, we reveal what a seminal study on legal empowerment calls the ‘systemic pathologies that 
limit access to rights possession and rights enforcement’.13 
 
2.2.1 Traditional distinctions 
Sumba is essentially an agricultural society. The large majority of the population makes a living 
through subsistence agriculture, producing rice, maize and other food crops for their own 
consumption, with the surplus being sold in the market. In East Sumba and the drier northern plains 
of the island, animal husbandry is another main economic activity. In Sumbanese rural society, a 
person’s wealth is linked to the possession of livestock.  In the past, traditional elites had large herds 
of horses, cattle or water buffalo, grazing free in the uncultivated lands. Pigs and poultry were found 
in nearly every home yard. Livestock is very important on Sumba as a sign of status, as the prime 
commodity in ceremonial exchange, as a necessary ingredient for all social events (since consensus is 
                                                
13 John Bruce (2007), Legal Empowerment of the Poor: From Concepts to Asessment. See http://www.bizclir. 
com/galleries/publications/Legal_Empowerment_of_the_Poor.pdf (last accessed on August 25, 2009). 
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expressed through sharing a meal with meat), and also as economic capital that can be sold in times 
of trouble.
14
 The poorest of the poor have no livestock at all, not even a dog or a chicken. 
 Ethnic criteria are used to create ‘insider-outsider’ distinctions. Over 90 percent of the 
population on Sumba is ethnic Sumbanese. There is greater ethnic heterogeneity in Sumba’s towns, 
and along the coastline of East Sumba there are many settlements of people originating from the 
nearby island Savu, whose prime occupation is fishing. Sumbanese also make sub-ethnic distinctions, 
according to the geographic place of origin, the territory of related clans, of which there are sixteen 
in West Sumba and eight in East Sumba.15 In the early twentieth century, the colonial government 
elevated traditional domains into self-governing sub-districts (zelfbesturende landschappen), and 
appointed one of the main clan leaders as king (raja) of each. This reinforced the power of the raja’s 
clan and its claim to the land, and its domain became integrated in the colonial maps of the island. In 
turn, the rajas were incorporated into the colonial structure of governance, with the formerly 
autonomous domains becoming subordinate polities within the nation-state, via a system of indirect 
rule. 
 Traditional social stratification within clans on Sumba divides the Sumbanese population 
vertically in three classes: the nobility, the free men and the slaves. Horizontally, society is divided 
into patrilineal clans (kabihu) that are mutually dependant because of the strict rule of exogamous 
marriages. Relationships between clans, and subsequently between members of various clans are 
expressed in terms of being either bride-giving or bride-taking, and this definition of positions 
determines proper conduct, and the appropriate type of ceremonial exchange commodities. Every 
major life cycle event requires a ceremony in which the wider social community attends. Such a 
ceremony reconfirms the members’ identities within the community, along with their rights and 
obligations. Together those rights, obligations and positions in the social hierarchy constitute a very 
strong normative system, with consequences for the distribution of access to natural resources and 
mutual support between members of society. Opportunities for those who occupy low positions in 
the traditional social hierarchy to move upwards are very small. Changing the system or its rules is 
difficult for those of lower status – unmarried men and women (‘youth’), women in general, slaves – 
because they have very little say in internal clan decision making. This traditional normative system, 
usually called adat, thus provides resources and protection for those in lower positions (the 
disadvantaged in this sense) but also entrenches their limited decision making power and their 
dependence upon clan leaders.  
  
2.2.2 Modern distinctions 
For many people living in the interior of Sumba, adat is still the dominant normative context. Yet, 
historical forces on Sumba have shaped a modern society that interacts with the traditional one, and 
most Sumbanese have and use a double identity: one based upon traditional kinship, one modern 
identity as an Indonesian citizen and adherent to a major world religion. Among these historical 
forces are: the development of the modern state in an agricultural society; the economic importance 
of the state in towns; the role of the Christian religion; and the detachment of the aristocracy from 
their village setting. The result is an alternative social hierarchy in which the top layer, the political 
class,
16
 consists of people whose primary source of livelihood comes from the state. They are 
employed by the state as civil servants, or provide paid services to the state, such as businessmen 
who execute state-financed construction projects. The main criterion for membership of the political 
class is practical, namely real influence on decisions regarding the allocation of state resources such 
as money, jobs, permits and violence.  
                                                
14 Louis Onvlee (1980), The significance of livestock on Sumba. In The flow of life, essays on eastern Indonesia, J. 
Fox (ed.). Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
15 Taro Goh (1991), Sumba Bibliography. Department of Anthropology, Canberra: The Australian National 
University, p. xii. 
16 Jacqueline Vel (2008), Uma Politics; An ethnography of democratization in West Sumba, Indonesia, 1986-
2006. Leiden: KITLV Press. pp. 16-8. 
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 In modern, political-economic terms, the lowest layer in society consists of farmers (tani). 
Tani is an emic term for people who work on the land and also for all other people without salaried 
employment or other clear means for generating income.
17
 Many members of the traditional class of 
nobility belong to the category of tani. They enjoy their high social rank, but have no other capital 
upon which to rely: no higher education, no paid employment, and no access to the right social 
networks. In between the tani and the political class is a small intermediate group that we refer to as 
the ‘political public’, ‘consisting of persons of a middle range of political effectiveness, persons 
outside the political elite who nevertheless saw themselves as capable of taking action which could 
affect national (district) government or politics.’
18
 Typically, this class includes members of NGOs, 
well-educated people who are yet to have found steady employment, as well as retired government 
officials and most members of the clergy.  
 
2.2.3 Practical aspects of disadvantage 
Being a member of a disadvantaged group in Sumba – such as a low traditional class, women and 
migrants – has significant practical implications. People who belong to the middle or lowest 
traditional class can own livestock, but whenever clan members of higher social status need it – for 
example to meet their adat obligations in marriage negotiations – they can easily claim their 
subordinates’ possessions. People of lower status are also obliged to work on fellow clan members’ 
land, and provide other services as decided by the clan leaders. Although this traditional pattern is 
not as strong as it was in the past, it still exists.   
 Women traditionally have an inferior position in relation to decision making within a clan. 
Marriage is regarded as exchange between patrilineal clans; after the wedding the bride moves to 
the house (and clan) of her husband. There she enters into the internal hierarchy in a position that is 
initially determined by her traditional social rank.  Her status can improve over time, for example, 
after she gives birth to her first child. In the rare cases of polygamous marriages, the first wife enjoys 
a higher status than the second. The private assets that women are permitted to own are ‘female 
objects’ such as jewellery, small livestock, pigs and hand woven cloths. Traditionally, women not 
permitted to own land except for land that is given to them at their wedding, as part of the dowry.  
However, this traditional scenario applies to differing degrees across Sumba, with some women living 
a more individualized lifestyle in which they are less restricted by the traditional system. 
 People originating from other islands are also disadvantaged in their access to land, because 
they are not members of the Sumbanese clans who own the land, although there are avenues by 
which non-native Sumbanese can be adopted into the traditional system (see Section 3.3.5 below). 
As members of a minority group, people with non-Sumbanese ethnic backgrounds are disadvantaged 
in adat dispute resolution, because adat rules specify that the will of the majority prevails. However, 
not all non-native Sumbanese are disadvantaged, particularly those who work in sectors independent 
of the traditional framework, including government services such as the police force and the army, or 
in trade. 
 
2.2.4 Analytical model for indicating relative power positions 
The internal criteria and practical aspects of poverty and disadvantage can be summarized 
analytically by using Bourdieu’s concept of ‘forms of capital’.19 As described above, being 
disadvantaged is not just a matter of having little money, but also refers to a lack of other assets and 
capacities that can be regarded as types of capital. Cultural capital refers to knowledge and 
education; economic capital to money but also access to resources and labour; social capital 
indicates relations with other members of society, and membership of social networks. In Table 2, we 
apply Bourdieu’s concepts to the Sumbanese context. Each of Bourdieu’s three forms of capital is 
discussed in its traditional and modern manifestation in Sumba, with a fourth form – ‘legal capital’, 
                                                
17 Emic means: defined by the actors themselves in a way that is meaningful in their socio-economic and 
cultural context. 
18 Herbert Feith, quoted in Uma Politics, Jacqueline Vel (2008). p. 17. 
19 Pierre Bourdieu (1986), The Forms of Capital. pp. 241-259. 
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actually a sub-category of cultural capital – discussed separately because of its importance for this 
study. This model can be used in other contexts, with adaptations as required.  For example, 
knowledge of adat might be replaced with knowledge of religious law if that is more important than 
adat, or knowledge of the history of migration in cases where rules of prior occupation apply. 
 
Table 2. Specification of forms of capital in context of Sumba 
 Cultural capital Legal capital Economic capital Social capital: 
networks 
Traditional * Position in adat 
hierarchy 
(incl. gender and 
ethnicity) 
* Knowledge of 
adat 
• Food  
• Land, 
• Livestock 
• Labour (number of 
people in the 
house, 
subordinates) 
• Kinship 
• Marriage alliance 
Modern  • Modern education  
• Office in 
bureaucracy or 
non state 
institution 
• Gender 
 
• Knowledge of 
state law 
• Knowledge and 
skill in legal 
and 
bureaucratic 
procedures 
*  Knowledge of 
church rules 
* Money (salaries, 
profits, illegal 
income) 
* Assets (houses, 
cars, tv sets, 
aircon, children 
with higher 
education)  
• Church 
• Organizations 
• Political parties 
• Functional / 
bureaucratic 
inside and 
outside Sumba 
 
In general, the ‘poorest’ or ‘most disadvantaged’ are those who lack all types of capital. The most 
powerful are those who have the optimal amount and combination of various forms of capital. The 
amount of capital a person possesses is not static: capital can be acquired through education or 
exchange. The challenge is to find opportunities for converting one type of capital into the other, so 
that it has a positive influence on the welfare or power position of the owner.  
 
For this study, we also refer to forms of capital to explain how people involved in land disputes make 
choices about redress mechanisms. Our limited research suggests that parties who have 
accumulated more capital are better able to progress their case in the hierarchy of redress 
mechanisms.  We will come back to this point in Section 5. 
 
2.3 Real life problems and injustices 
Real life problems differ according to a person’s position within the social hierarchy and their level of 
material poverty. For those at the bottom of society – lacking all types of capital – the biggest real life 
problem is basic survival, in terms of food, health and shelter. The main determinants of whether a 
person can produce enough food to survive are access to sufficient labour and access to land. In 
Sumba, the poorest of the poor can still grow their own food on dry land. Box 2 presents an extreme 
example of the real life problems faced by disadvantaged people in Central Sumba. 
 
Box 2.  Widow’s problems in a land dispute 
Ina Modi had four young children when her husband died, 5 years ago. They were farmers, living in the 
village of Ina Modi’s husband, close to his relatives. Her husband had a paddy field and dry land gardens 
that were ‘individual adat land’: clan land that within the clan was considered to be individual property 
of her husband, and for which he paid tax. After her husband’s death, his cousins had an eye on the land. 
One of them also planned to take Ina Modi as his wife, which is a traditional way of caring for a brother’s 
widow, and which does not require any additional bride payments. Ina Modi did not like the prospect of 
becoming a second wife at all, and she refused. Moreover, she insisted on continuing to live in her own 
house with her children, and to work on her late husband’s land until her son was big enough to take 
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over. However, the cousins did not want to give Ina Modi any assistance with labour. She asked the 
village head for help with settling the dispute, but his advice was that the dispute should be settled 
within the family (secara keluarga).  Unfortunately, this method did not work in Ina Modi’s favour. When 
she scolded the cousins for not treating her well, and thus not honoring her late husband, they beat her 
up. Hurt and afraid she ran off to the closest police station, about 12 kilometers from her village. The 
police did not do much for her either, and Ina Modi did not have money to persuade them to act. She 
then stayed at the office of a women’s NGO for a while and they helped her to get her eldest children 
into the nearby orphanage, where they received shelter and education. With occasional help from other 
villagers and moral support from the NGO staff, she has managed to return to her house, but the land 
dispute with her husband’s cousins remains unresolved. 
 
For households that have enough to eat and a house in which to live, but still have very little capital, 
financing the children’s education is the principal real life problem. In this context, agricultural 
produce can be sold to pay for schooling, in effect converting economic capital into cultural capital. 
Education is the first step towards obtaining wage-based employment and the possibility of escape 
from low-yield agriculture as a main source of income. The ideal arrangement for many Sumbanese is 
to have a close relative in a wage-earning position, and then share the monetary income with a 
larger group in return for food, labour and ceremonial services. Networks connect rural and urban 
Sumbanese, and younger and older generations, and these connections allow food and domestic 
labour to be brought to town, with money and luxury goods being returned to the village. Urban 
professionals can rely on their village partners to organize weddings and funerals in the ancestral 
village, while villagers have a base in town for their children’s schooling and for medical care.  For 
villagers, land is the critical economic asset (economic capital) that enables them to create social 
networks with people in town. The poorest people in Sumba are those in the rural areas who lack 
these networks.   
Another category of real life problem directly related land is when people are faced with 
‘urgent financial needs’ (kebutuhan mendesak). The first major cause of such sudden large 
expenditures is severe illness. Medical care is now available on the island, but hospital treatment is 
expensive, and there is no health insurance system that is accessible for the poor. The second most 
common cause of urgent financial needs is the death of a close relative, in particular close family-in-
law. Adat rules require that the son-in-law bring a water buffalo to the funeral. Water buffalo have 
become relatively scarce, compared to 20 years ago, when they were used in agriculture to trample 
the paddy fields.  This has resulted in the price of buffalo increasing markedly.  In both situations, the 
only way out is often pledging a piece of land, as described in Box 3 below.  
 
Box 3.  Land and indebtedness 
Lewa is an area in the middle of Sumba that is known as one of the island’s rice-producing areas. 
Recently, migrants from the more densely populated areas in West Sumba have migrated to Lewa, 
trying to find employment. They start as petty commodity traders and work as agricultural labourers. 
An NGO worker who has lived in this area for decades and cultivates rice fields (sawah) himself told us 
that many farmers who originate from this area have lost their land to these new migrants and to 
other traders. When the farmers suddenly face high expenditures (due, for example, to severe illness 
or the death of a relative) a migrant or trader may lend them money, and in ‘borrow’ a patch of their 
land.
20
 The initial terms on which these agreements are negotiated may become less favourable for 
the landowner when additional expenditures force him to seek assistance again from the land 
borrower. In this way, a sequence of transactions takes place and can eventually force the owner to 
approve the issuing of a certificate of land ownership in the borrower’s name. Most land that is 
borrowed never returns to the owner.  Although state law says that after 7 years, the harvest serves as 
repayment of the debt, this is not accepted on Sumba.
21
 Instead, adat rules for pledging provide that 
the land can only be returned to the original owner once the loan is actually repaid.  This usually 
means perpetual indebtedness (or permanent loss of assets) for the poor.  
                                                
20 Individually cultivated part of clan land (tanah kabihu), which will be explained in Section 3.  
21 See Section 3.3.3. 
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Do the people facing these real life problems relating to land perceive them as injustices? This is not 
an easy question to answer. In the case described in Box 3, the original owner of the land will face a 
real problem in trying to produce enough food while his rice field is pledged. However, he was 
perfectly aware of the customary pledging rules and accepted those when he pledged his land. 
Perceiving a problem as an injustice implies comparison with a normative standard, whereby the 
situation is seen to fall below the standard. In Sumba, this happens when outsiders violate adat 
norms – the violation of the traditional norm is immediately regarded as an injustice. People who are 
from an outsiders’ point of view disadvantaged by adat norms may also come to regard their 
problems as injustices when they learn about the options provided by alternative normative systems, 
of which state law is the most relevant in Sumba. The next section of this paper explores the 
normative framework pertaining to land in Sumba.  It is on the basis of this framework that a person 
will on will not regard their problem as an injustice. Identifying a problem as an injustice is a critical 
step in determining whether a person will seek redress, or merely accept their fate. Many of the 
boxes in this section also hint at the potential local people’s perceptions on what is fair and just to 
change. For example, education, the media and NGO activities can increase people’s awareness of 
civil and human rights. However, more research would be needed in order to draw any conclusions 
about how such abstract concepts influence people in Sumba. 
 
 
3. The current land regime in Sumba: analyzing the hybrid 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Boxes 2 and 3 provide two examples of land conflicts affecting the poor. In both cases, the land rights 
in question were subject to customary law. In Sumba, the population, as well as the government and 
judiciary, regard customary law as the primary source of law for the regulation of land rights. 
However, exceptions to this rule are becoming more frequent. In residential areas where people 
build permanent houses, individual property of land – documented by way of a state issued land 
certificate – is increasing. There are a number of what could be called ‘market forces’ that are driving 
the individualization of land property. Relatively wealthy people who have bought high value land 
are increasingly relying upon non-customary legal means to secure those transactions. Forces within 
the customary system are also eroding the authority of customary rules and institutions. For 
example, we were told that well-educated members of a clan (kabihu) often find it difficult to accept 
the decision-making power of their less educated relatives who, according to adat, have the status of 
clan elder.  In this section we describe the current regulatory regimes regarding land in Sumba, 
starting with the traditional status of clan land (tana kabihu), discussing the various types of land 
transaction and finally examining the acquisition of land by government for commercial purposes.  
 
3.2 Tana kabihu: clan land under customary law 
Traditionally, Sumbanese land is clan property, tana kabihu. The Sumbanese think of their island in 
terms of domains, and their personal identities are linked to these domains.
22
 The early ancestors 
distributed land within their domain, and the way in which they did so demonstrates the way in 
which land distribution and use was linked to mutual cooperation and rituals (see Box 4 below). The 
legitimacy of adat is based upon a belief in the authority and power of the deified ancestors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Rodney Needham (1987), Mamboru: History and Structure in a Domain of Northwestern Sumba. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 6-8. 
Van Vollenhoven Institute  Access to Justice in Indonesia  
Leiden University  Working Paper Series: Land 
 13 
Box 4. Land distribution in the far past 
Before the colonial period, domains were delineated by reference to the territory first occupied by a 
certain ancestor. The clan of that ancestor was the lord of the land (mangu tana).
23
 Onvlee argued 
that ties to the mangu tana determined unity of the people and clans within a certain domain. Clans 
with a clear and acknowledged link to the mangu tana identified themselves with the domain in terms 
of social organisation and territory. The mangu tana would divide responsibility for performing rituals 
amongst the other clans in the domain.  For example, one clan would do the rituals for fertility, 
another for rain, a third for blessing and protection in case of war, one for purification and a fifth – 
“those who command lightning” – for punishment in case of theft or other offences.
24
 This 
cooperation between these clans would guard the wellbeing of all who lived in the domain.   
 
Ouwehand
25
 wrote in 1951 that both the colonial government and the Indonesian government after 
independence acknowledged that whatever the official state law would be, in practice access and 
control over land in Sumba would be ruled by the existing customary law.
26
 He added that the 
continuation of this policy after independence was in no small part attributable to the fact that the 
island’s highest government officials were members of the indigenous nobility, whose local authority 
was grounded in principles of customary law.27 The classic assumption is that the chiefs represent the 
community in dealing with outsiders, and that internally they have the authority and responsibility to 
regulate how community members use the community’s resources.
28
  
In the interview we conducted with the Deputy District Chief of Central Sumba – who is one 
of the traditional nobility in that district – he confirmed the assumption, adding that there is no 
problem with access to land because clan leaders will always take care of their clan members and 
provide them with a part of the clan land (tanah kabihu). The case in Box 5 demonstrates how state 
courts recognize customary land rights, and also reveals that the chiefs’ land management does not 
always coincide with the common people’s interests. 
 
Box 5.  State court confirms status clan land (tanah kabihu) in Prai Liu 
Kampung Prailiu, close to East Sumba’s capital Waingapu, is the core residential area of the former 
king (raja) of the traditional domain and (colonial) sub-district swapraja Prailiu. In the 1990s the head 
of this kampong, Umbu N, wanted to build a house just outside the traditional village on a piece of 
land that was being cultivated by a man of lower traditional social status called Hina. Hina objected to 
the building plans and argued that the land was not Prailiu clan land (tanah kabihu). Instead, he 
argued that it was his own land, because his grandfather had opened it for cultivation in 1956 and 
both his father and Hina himself had cultivated the land ever since. The tombs of Hina’s father and 
grandfather are located on that land, which is a traditional sign of an individual’s claim to land, or at 
least a sign of the absence of protest by any other potential land owner. He said that up to the 
moment Umbu N wanted to build his house, there had never been any objection to Hina using and 
claiming the land. Umbu N’s counter argument was that his father had in fact instructed Hina’s 
grandfather to open the land, and that it used to be the place where guests visiting kampong Prailiu 
would keep their horses. 
 Hina refused to surrender and brought the case to the court. The judge faced a problem 
because it was very hard to find witnesses to give evidence regarding the history of the land in the 
1950s. Moreover, the witnesses who did testify gave inconsistent accounts. Umbu N was supported by 
a petition signed by 98 persons originating from 48 clans in Sumba that at one point
29
 comprised the 
traditional council of clan representatives that used to rule on matters that were beyond the domain 
of a single member clan. This council is referred to as ‘a series of clans, a row of houses’ (‘ndalar 
                                                
23 Louis Onvlee (1973), Cultuur als antwoord. In Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en 
Volkenkunde (66). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. p. 125. 
24 Louis Onvlee (1973), Cultuur als antwoord. pp. 126-7. 
25 C. Ouwehand (1951), Adatrecht en daerahwetgeving met betrekking tot bosbescherming op Sumba. In 
Indonesië (4). p. 539. 
26 Sumba was under indirect rule of the colonial regime. See Section 3.4.2. 
27 C. Ouwehand (1951), Adatrecht en daerahwetgeving. p. 542. 
28 Kurnia Toha (2007), The struggle over land rights. pp. 51-2. 
29 During the period Lewa-Kambera was one administrative area (swapraja) (1917-1960). 
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kabihu juru watu uma’), meaning that they are members of one ancestral village.
30
 The petition 
declared that (A) Hina’s clan was not a member of the council, (B) thus he and his fellow kabihu 
members do not have rights to claim land in and around Prailiu village, (C) his arguments for claiming 
the land were false, and (D) as members of the ‘ndalar kabihu juru watu uma’ they solemnly declared 
that the land belonged to Umbu N and his kabihu already for at least six generations. 
 The judge decided that the land was adat land (tanah adat) that Umbu N had inherited from 
his forefathers. Hina appealed the decision, but subsequent verdicts were also in favour of Umbu N.  
 
Sumbanese customary law does not rely upon any written documentation for evidence or legitimacy 
of assertions.  In rare cases, there are documents that support a person’s claim to land, for example a 
will. However, territorial claims are usually supported by oral narratives that connect the land to a 
person’s genealogy, and preferably indicate a direct link between the claimant and the clan’s 
founding ancestor, the lord of the land (marapu kabihu). In addition, the presence of an ancestor’s 
tomb on land the subject of a claim is a clear sign of ownership. Sumbanese feel connected to their 
land – it is part of their identity – and they are therefore often offended when the connnection is 
contested (see Box 9 below).  
 A common myth about adat land in Indonesia concerns communal tenure. Kurnia Toha 
stressed that indigenous property regimes comprise bundles of rights possessed by both customary 
law communities as a whole, as well as by their members individually.
31
 Toha argued that the 
practical rule is that the longer and more intensively a community member uses a parcel of land, the 
stronger is his or her individual property right. According to this rule, residential plots and 
permanently cultivated or high-yielding agricultural parcels would logically be seen as individual 
property. However, the case in Box 5 showed that this ‘practical rule’ does not apply in all cases, and 
that there is ample room for negotiation regarding individual adat claims to land. Cultural capital in 
the form of high (traditional) social status and legal capital – knowledge of adat, skill in constructing 
the historical arguments and ritual techniques – are powerful assets in adat negotiations. Poor and 
disadvantaged people usually lack these forms of capital. 
 Two other myths about adat concern the non-transferability of land rights and the exclusion 
of outsiders. The next section dispels these myths by describing the range of land transfers that can 
occur in Sumba, and the types of land disputes they often create. 
 
3.3 Customary land transfer 
Indonesian students who study land law or agrarian law learn that indigenous property rights cannot 
be transferred, but according to Toha there is no evidence for this general statement in practice.
32
 In 
this section, we argue that land transfers should be divided into (i) transfers within the customary 
community and (ii) alienation to outsiders. Within a community, land may be transferred in a variety 
of ways, ranging from the most general arrangement of giving-borrowing to the most definite 
arrangement of selling-purchasing. Each of these arrangements gives rise to distinct types of conflict, 
as discussed below.  For each type of conflict, we highlight the role of the ‘poor and disadvantaged’ 
with illustrations from our field research. A general remark at the outset is that land is seldom 
transferred to the poor; instead, it is inevitably the poor who are losing their fields. Moreover, 
conflicts in which poor people lose their land often fail to evolve into open disputes, because the 
poor often find themselves forced to surrender their rights at the very early stages of the process. 
 
3.3.1 Division of land within the clan (kabihu): conflicts about inheritance 
According to adat, the only land that is by definition 100 percent communal is the land of the spirits 
(tana marapu), or holy land, that cannot be cultivated and is subject to many restrictions.33 All other 
clan land is distributed internally amongst members of the clan. State tax invoices are used as 
                                                
30 Louis Onvlee (1984), Kamberaas (Oost Soembaas) – Nederlands Woordenboek. Leiden: KITLV/Fortis. p. 118. 
31 Kurnia Toha (2007), The struggle over land rights. p. 56. 
32 Kurnia Toha (2007), The struggle over land rights. pp. 57-62. 
33 C. Ouwehand (1951), Adatrecht en daerahwetgeving. p. 540. 
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evidence of this internal distribution, which is one of the reasons why most people are eager to pay 
land tax. Land that is subject to an individual claim can also be inherited. Generally, only sons can 
inherit land, with older sons usually receiving a larger share than the younger. Likewise, if a deceased 
man had more than one wife, the sons of the wife with the highest status will inherit more than the 
sons of the other wives. A wife’s status depends upon her traditional social status (which is reflected 
in the bride price paid for her) and seniority ranking (ie. sons of the first wife generally inherit more 
than those of the second and third).  Preferential marriage (which means the wife is her husband’s 
mother’s brother’s daughter) is also a reason why the sons inherit more land than their half brothers 
in such a polygamous household. Despite these ‘objective’ inheritance rules, in practice men often 
bequeath the larger share of their property to the sons of their most beloved wife. Inheritance issues 
can often result in true injustices for poor Sumbanese, as Box 6 illustrates. 
Box 6. A young single landowner among many poor relatives 
Umbu Mabi (UM) had lived in the hamlet (kampung) Parikatoda since he was a young man. He moved 
there when the founder of the hamlet Umbu Rosu (UR), needing labourers to work on his lands, asked 
him to move to his house to  live permanently. Later on, UM married, built his own house in the 
kampung and obtained land from UR ‘to grow his own food’. Umbu Mabi’s status was not that of an 
officially adopted son, but rather that of a subordinate ‘person in the house’. People with such a low 
status cannot own land, but may only work on the land of their master.
34
   
 UM and his wife had five sons. None of them went to school longer than a few years, and all 
stayed in the kampong and tried to find a living in agriculture or herding other people’s livestock. UR’s 
own son, who was about ten years younger than UM, grew up, married and had four children: three 
daughters and one son. He cultivated his father’s rice fields and had good yields for many years. He 
could afford to send his children to school and all of them graduated from at least secondary school. 
The daughters married men with salaried jobs and went to live with their husbands elsewhere. 
 Last year UR’s son suddenly died, leaving an only son 18 years of age and, according to adat 
rules, the single heir to all of his father’s land. However, he could not cultivate all the land on his own. 
Seeing this situation, UM’s sons claimed their right to cultivate some of UR’s land, as their own 
individual share of the clan land. They all lived in the village and needed land to sustain their 
households. This gave rise to a dispute between UR’s son’s widow and heir on the one hand and UM’s 
sons on the other. The widow and heir rejected the claims, because they were afraid that upgrading 
UM’s sons’ rights from a mere favour enabling them ‘to grow their own food’, to become individual 
use rights over clan land would mean permanent loss of access for themselves. At the time of writing, 
the dispute remained unresolved.  
 
According to adat inheritance rules, the young heir  in Box 6 was the owner of the land. However, 
one could wonder whether, as the grandson of UM’s patron, he was also under an obligation to 
provide UM’s sons with a means by which to grow their own food.  UM’s sons could not base their 
claims on land on adat rules, but their appeal to UR’s grandson’s obligation can be seen as grounded 
in the human rights to life and to not be treated as a slave. 
 
3.3.2. Lending land: unclear arrangements 
As demonstrated in Box 6, land conflicts often develop after a person lends a piece of land to 
someone else. There are no fixed or explicit commitments for return services by the borrower, nor 
statements concerning the period during which the borrower can use the land. The words commonly 
used to describe these arrangements are ‘giving’ (kasih) and ‘borrowing’ (pinjam). Though no 
commitments are made express, many are implied. Borrowing a piece of land means accepting a 
relationship of general reciprocity – in other words, opening the door for a potentially endless series 
of requests by the lender for money, food, or other types of material support.
35
 In Sumba, borrowing 
                                                
34 Y. Argo Twikromo (2008), The local elite and the appropriation of modernity: a case in East Sumba, 
Indonesia. PhD Dissertation Radboud University Nijmegen. Yogyakarta: Kanisius Media. pp. 170-7. 
35
 Jacqueline Vel (1994). The Uma economy: Indigenous Economics and Development Work in Lawonda, Sumba 
(Eastern Indonesia).  Wageningen: Agricultural University. pp. 63-6. 
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land carries with it a connotation that the borrower is accepting a subordinate position regarding the 
owner of the land.
36
 The borrower often provides the lender with resources they need, such as 
labour. The children of borrowers often stay at the landowner’s house to provide domestic help. 
Borrowers who are comparatively more wealthy may also provide the landowner with meals, money 
and other services such as transport. When the land is a rice field, they are also obliged to give the 
landowner part of the harvest. 
Conflicts about borrowed land often occur when the original conditions of the transaction 
have changed over time. For example, the borrower builds a house on a borrowed dry land field that 
was meant for growing corn and other food crops, or a borrowed piece of dry land suddenly 
increases in value because it is located along a new road, or because a plantation or other 
commercial activity is planned for the area. Box 10 (in Section 5 below) provides an example of a 
conflict about land that started with a lending arrangement.  
 
 3.3.3. Pledging (menggadai)  
We have already provided an example of pledging in Box 3 above, regarding ’Land and 
indebtedness’. This is a very common type of land transfer for the poor. As discussed, pledging 
usually occurs where the landowner needs money or livestock, and so grants usage rights over his 
land to the person who provides what he needs. The land will only return to the original owner after 
the debt has been repaid. In Sumba this adat rule is apparently more valid than the state legislation, 
which stipulates that after seven years a pledged parcel should return to its owner.
37
 There is no 
fixed price for these arrangements, and the terms depend upon the social distance between the 
owner and the borrower, the quality and size of the land (which determine expected yields), and the 
urgency of the owner’s credit needs. For poor landowners, it is very hard to regain their land. Usually 
pledging arrangements are in place for many years, which also creates an opportunity for differences 
of opinion concerning the initial terms of the arrangement.  
For these reasons, many land conflicts relate to pledged land. When seeking a resolution for 
such a dispute, both parties find it difficult to present convincing evidence, as pledging agreements 
are usually made orally, and without witnesses. To cope with this problem and ‘avoid too much head 
ache’, one village government in Central Sumba decided in 2008 to start registering pledging 
contracts. However, the village secretary admitted that only a very small percentage of pledgers 
wanted to register, because registration involved paying administration fees to the village secretary, 
increasing costs for people already in urgent need of money.  
 
3.3.4 Selling land to fellow community members 
The concept of selling land to fellow community members is alien to Sumbanese adat. Adat does not 
allow permanent alienation of land, and the close social distance between fellow community 
members means that ‘giving – borrowing’ would be the appropriate arrangement. Selling land 
implies cutting ties with the history of the land, and cutting the links between the owner (and their 
clan) and the land. This construction is hardly conceivable for traditional Sumbanese. However, it is 
now becoming a reality, as transfers of land that traditionally would be seen as ‘lending’ for an open 
period of time are now being registered through the state administrative procedures of titling, 
registering, certification and notary deeds concerning sale and purchase.  
The cases we encountered involved sellers who were in urgent need of money or livestock, in 
a similar way to those described in Box 3 above, and in Section 3.3.2 on lending land. The cases 
concerned relatively high-value land, and as such only relatively wealthy purchasers could afford the 
price. Moreover, purchasing requires sufficient legal capital in the form of knowledge about the 
administrative procedures by which the required documents could be arranged. Jurisprudence in the 
                                                
36 Gregory L. Forth (1981). Rindi - an ethnographic study of a traditional domain in eastern Sumba. In 
Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (93). The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff. p. 253. 
37 Article 7 of regulation-in-lieu-of-law 56/1960( PERPU 56/1960, PENETAPAN LUAS TANAH) PERTANIAN, see 
http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/perpu_56_1960.htm (last accessed on May 19, 2009). 
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coming years will reveal whether state law, which is more protective of purchasers, will be upheld 
over adat law, which is more protective to the seller. Box 7 presents an example involving a relatively 
wealthy but female (and thus disadvantaged in adat) purchaser. 
 
Box 7.  Security of tenure regarding land purchased from a relative 
Ibu Tina is an unmarried 65-year old lady who lives in a nice house close to the main road connecting 
the capital town of Central Sumba, Waibakul, with the capital of West Sumba. She retired a few years 
ago from her position as a civil servant. In 2006, she heard that a relative urgently needed money for 
the wedding of his daughter, and that he wanted to sell a piece of land along the main road. As a 
woman without a husband, purchasing was the only way she could obtain land property. Ibu Tina took 
this opportunity and negotiated with the owner. She could only afford it if he would agree to let her 
pay in instalments, and as they were relatives, he agreed. Ibu Tina paid accordingly and arranged the 
legal documents.  
In January 2009, Ibu Tina heard that the former owner intended to retrieve the land he sold 
to her, because he needed a piece of land on which to build a house for his son.  Rumour had it that 
the former owner even planned to bring the case to the State Court. In spite of the fact that she held 
all legal documents, Ibu Tina did not feel comfortable about the prospect of her ownership being 
contested. The sale of land to a relative leaves open a number of adat arguments, which would 
undermine her rights over the land, and as such she was unconvinced that her official legal documents 
would provide full tenure security. 
 
3.3.5 Transferring land to strangers 
A traditional way of providing land access to strangers – people with whom no prior kinship or 
marriage ties exist – is by granting them a position within the kinship system. The landowner will act 
as if he is the bride giver, and the ‘tenant’ as if he is the bride taker. At the time of the initial transfer, 
the ‘tenant’ gives bride wealth-type goods, such as horses and golden pendants, to the land owning 
clan.38 These goods are not regarded as a payment for the land, but rather as a confirmation of the 
new social relations. According to the new relationship between the landowner and ‘tenant’, general 
reciprocity is the proper mode of exchange. The landowner anticipates that he will benefit from the 
transfer, for example, by receiving assistance from the ‘tenant’ to meet any sudden ‘urgent needs’ 
(kebutuhan mendesak). This construct was, for example, used to allow non-local NGO staff to settle 
down in the rural area in which they work, as described in Box 8.  
 
Box 8.  Legal construct for  access to adat land by non-locals 
In the 1980s, Ibu Yuli and Pak Okta wanted to build a house close to their NGO office in a village in 
Central Sumba, where they worked as senior staff members. Ibu Yuli was Javanese and Pak Okta 
Sumbanese, but not from this village. At the time, it was not possible to purchase land in the area. 
However, the owner of the land adjacent to the NGO office was willing to provide the land Pak Okta 
had in mind for building a house. The landowner acted as if he was the bride giving party – implicitly 
adopting Ibu Yuli into his clan – and consequently asked Pak Okta to bring him horses and buffalo for 
the transfer ceremony. After the ceremony, the land was considered individual adat property of Ibu 
Yuli and Pak Okta. They built their house, and when their youngest child died in 1989 at the age of only 
two weeks, they buried her in a tomb close to the house. The house had a large yard and Pak Okta 
planted many trees. When he died in 2003, he was buried in a large tomb close to the house. In 2007, 
the village was included in a national government programme for measuring land parcels and 
registering land rights.  Ibu Yuli was eager to have her residential plot measured and registered, and 
the fact that the officer of the National Land Agency who was in charge of measuring and registering 
was a fellow Javanese helped to get the job done quickly and without any payment. Ibu Yuli arranged 
a land ownership certificate on the name of her eldest son. When we asked what would happen to the 
land if she and her son would decide to leave, all Sumbanese present agreed that the son would not 
be entitled to sell, and that the land would return to the original landowner. Another, more junior 
staff member of the NGO used the same construct but was less successful. He was not able to give the 
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number of horses and buffalo the landlord expected to receive at the initial transfer, and thus had a 
concrete debt to the landowner. When he died, his widow was not allowed to put up a tomb close to 
the house, and the landowner also refused registration during the PRONA program. Apparently, they 
did not have enough  capital (social, economic and cultural) to be adopted into permanent positions 
within the landowner’s clan. 
 
We recently came across a similar construct, when a potential plantation owner told us about the 
negotiations he had with ‘local leaders’ about access to land for the plantation company.
39
 One of 
these local leaders had told the businessman that he would not have to pay for the land in cash, but 
that he could get access by giving a number of horses or buffalo to the land-owning clan. Without 
background knowledge of these types of arrangements, it is difficult for outsiders such as plantation 
owners to understand the implications of such an offer, and the extent of tenure (in)security 
involved.  
 
3.3.6 Land for women 
Several of the above cases have shown that access to land for women is very limited in Sumba. 
Traditionally, a widow is only entitled to take care of her husband’s or her son’s land (see Box 2). 
Relatively wealthy women can purchase land, but their tenure may never be entirely secure (see Box 
7). In general, women cannot own adat land, and daughters cannot inherit land. However, there is 
one exception, the single option within the adat system for fathers who want to give their daughters 
land just like their male siblings: land given to a woman as part of her dowry. This land is referred to 
in ritual speech as ‘a pig that won’t grow old, a cloth that will not wear out’ (wawi da kaweda, kaba 
da kapuga), meaning land that will provide for the daughter’s needs in perpetuity. One informant 
told us that the type of land that could be given in this way includes land that a father had 
purchased, and which was never a part of the clan’s land. Despite this exception, our general 
conclusion is that women in Sumba are disadvantaged when it comes to access to and control over 
land. 
 
3.4 Applying state law to land 
In Section 3.2 above, we have explained that land on Sumba is traditionally regarded as clan land. 
However, state law is increasingly being applied. Two developments regarding state title to land are 
particularly important for this paper: the development of the land market and the acquisition of land 
for large scale plantations. Both developments have created tensions between original landowners, 
state institutions and businessmen. The critical question is who has the authority to make decisions 
about the distribution and use of land: market forces, the state or the customary chiefs? 
 
3.4.1 Developing land markets in Sumba 
With increasing differentiation of economic activities and a growing political class with purchasing 
power, the land market in Sumba is developing rapidly. In a land market, parcels of land are 
differentiated according to their market- or exchange value. Intense competition over a parcel of 
land results in high value, whereas land that interests no one has the lowest value. Land values are 
highest in and around centres of economic activity, and decrease according to the distance from that 
centre (physical and ease of access). On the map of Sumba, some high value land is found along the 
main roads connecting the capital towns, with larger areas around the business and administrative 
centres of these towns. These are areas in which land is titled and registered, both by individuals 
who want to obtain documents that increase their security of tenure over their residential plots and 
paddy fields, as well as through government registration programmes. Box 7 (‘Tenure security 
concerning land purchased from a relative’) and Box 11 (‘Good government officials do not 
encroach’) illustrate these processes. Registering low value land is not necessary – since there is not 
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much competition over such land – and is considered too costly in light of the low yields obtained 
from such land. 
 However, land that is not cultivated, and only occasionally used for herding livestock always 
had a very low value, but now that value is increasing because such land is attracting interest from  
plantation developers. With this development, marginal areas of ‘sleeping land’ (lahan tidur) are 
suddenly turned into centres of economic activity. Because low value land is usually not registered 
and no one claimed the land before there were plans for plantations, there is ample opportunity for 
land grabbing. 
 
3.4.2 Defining plantation areas as ‘state land’ or people’s property 
Whether land that is not cultivated, or has not been cultivated for a long period, can be considered 
state land is a very old debate in Indonesia. This distinction was formalised in law during the colonial 
era with the Agrarian Law of 1870, in particular its first article, the Domain Declaration, which 
declared all uncultivated lands the domain of the state (in directly ruled areas). Many indigenous 
communities contested this declaration, claiming their customary rights to the land, whether it was 
cultivated or not. After independence, the Basic Agrarian Law aimed to unify the land law system by 
transforming all land claims into rights as defined by this law. However, this was never fully realised, 
and in Sumba, adat rights regarding non–cultivated land co-exists with potential state claims. 
 With the recent move towards regional autonomy, it is now the district government that is in 
charge of state land within its district. The first regional autonomy law (Law No 22 of 1999) 
completely devolved authority over land affairs to the district governments, each of which had a new 
Land Board (Badan Pertanahan) to manage land affairs. This represented a severe reduction in the 
powers of the National Land Administration Board (NLA, Badan Pertahanan Nasional), and a great 
opportunity for district governments to use their local natural resources as political assets. However, 
this aspect of regional autonomy did not last long. One month after the regional autonomy laws had 
been implemented, President Wahid issued Presidential Decree No 10 of 2001, which stated that all 
existing land related legislation would remain in force (unaffected by regional autonomy) until 
implementing legislation had been enacted. Two years later, this implementing legislation was 
created in the form of Presidential Decree No 34 of 2003. Article 2 of that Decree limited authority of 
district or municipal governments to nine areas of regulation:  
 
1. the issuing of location permits;  
2. land clearance in the interests of development (pembangunan); 
3. settlement of disputes over farmed land (tanah garapan); 
4. settlement of disputes related to compensation and aid money regarding land clearance for 
development; 
5. determining what land is available, and who is eligible, for land redistribution; 
6. compensation for land exceeding the maximum plot size and neglected land (tanah 
absentee); 
7. settlement of problems related to communal land (tanah ulayat);
40
 
8. use of and settlement of problems related to empty land (tanah kosong), and granting 
permits to open/develop new land, and: 
9. spatial planning. 
 
Missing from this list are the politically sensitive functions of land titling and registration, mapping 
and conflict resolution. The NLA has retained those functions, and thus that part of land 
management remained integrated into the vertical, sectoral structure of administration, instead of 
being devolved to the district governments.  
                                                
40 The concept tanah ulayat is translated as communal land, and derived from the Minangkabau land ownership 
system. It refers to the land that is claimed by adat communities, hence the translation as ‘communal’. See 
Bakker 2008:1. 
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In Sumba, most of the land that is considered for large scale agribusiness activities is not 
registered as private property (ie. there are no land certificates), and it is not cultivated. The district 
government’s most important function is issuing location permits for companies. If a district head 
wants to provide land to an agribusiness for plantations, he can either declare the land state land, or 
arrange negotiations with the local population in order to try to persuade them to hand over the land 
to the state (pembebasan tanah) so that the company can commence the procedure to obtain 
cultivation rights from the government (hak guna usaha).The process for issuing location permits 
should involve public participation. The cases in Section 4 show how the degree to which public 
participation in fact took place. 
 When there are no individuals holding landownership certificates, past experience teaches 
that negotiations between government, business and the ‘local population’ only involve the 
customary chiefs, instead of all clan members who have an individual right or claim to the clan land. 
Box 9 below gives an example of one such negotiation process. Discussions we had with potential 
investors indicated that they were always in search of the ‘local kings’ with whom they could settle 
land affairs. Local lower status customary landowners in the northern coastal area of Memboro told 
us that they had very little information about the content of the negotiations concerning plantations 
in their areas, and that up until February 2009 these meetings only involved chiefs, many of whom 
reside in the capital town and have a position in the bureaucracy. 
 One of the primary reasons that local people obtain landownership certificates is due to 
government incentives for plantation companies. Various regulations issued by the Ministry of 
Finance have introduced subsidised credit schemes for biofuel plantations, on the condition that the 
credit receivers are farmers who cooperate in or with the plantation,41 and the farmers hold formal 
land titles. In such cases, the financing strategies of the plantation are the driving force behind 
registration and titling of farmers’ land.  
 
3.5 The current hybrid system 
Section 3 and the empirical examples in the boxes above illustrate the extent to which people in this 
adat dominated island deal with issues pertaining to land in changing circumstances. They have 
created a dynamic and practical hybrid system, in which elements of various normative systems are 
combined. The widow in Box 2 did not accept the consequences of the customary way of taking care 
of a widow and sought assistance from police and NGO workers. The indebted landowners in Box 3 
would get their pledged land back sooner if state law were to be applied. The lower status person in 
Box 5 who had built a house on the land his grandfather cultivated felt he had a rightful claim, and 
dared to oppose the adat leaders, although in this case he did not succeed, and the adat leaders 
were able to confirm several adat rules through the state courts. Box 6, about Umbu Mabi, also hints 
at changes in the perception of injustice in favour of equity and against the norms set by adat. Box 7 
and 8 show examples of alienating land, by either ignoring adat rules or by stretching them up to be 
able to include new circumstances. In both cases, there is no real security of tenure because it is 
uncertain which rules will prevail in the end. 
How does this hybrid legal system apply when companies want to set up large plantations in 
Sumba?  
 
 
4. Regional autonomy, plantations and commoditization of land 
 
Capturing complex processes of change in a few words is always very difficult, and is made more so 
because we know that there has never been an ‘ideal’ past in Sumba when all matters were resolved 
according to a ‘pure form’ of adat. Further, changes do not occur all of a sudden. Commoditization in 
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Sumba for example has been occurring for at least a century.42 Yet, since 2001 there have been two 
major changes that have affected land issues in Sumba dramatically and will continue to do so in the 
near future: regional autonomy and the rise of large scale (internationally financed) agribusiness 
activities.  
 
4.1 Regional autonomy’s consequences for the land market 
The landmark in administrative decentralization came in January 2001, when the laws on regional 
autonomy (Laws No 22 of 199 and 25 of 1999) began to be implemented. The most important 
aspects or consequences of regional autonomy in the context of this case study are the following 
three developments. 
 First, regional autonomy stimulated demand for land for residential purposes in strategic 
locations. Decentralization resulted in an increase in the district government budget in Sumba of 
about 300 percent. The formula by which regional budgetary allocations are determined gave 
resource-poor areas with low locally generated government income a greater share than they 
received before regional autonomy.43 As a consequence, the district government had much more to 
spend, and the purchasing power of the political class increased accordingly.  This led to an increase 
in private demand for land to build houses. 
 Second, public demand for land also increased. Law No 22 of 1999 and Government 
Regulation 129 of 2000 introduced the option of creating new districts (pemekaran). Accordingly, in 
2007, West Sumba was split into three new districts, ‘bringing the government closer to the people’
44
 
and giving a boost to local economic and infrastructure development. The new districts needed a 
whole new bureaucratic infrastructure, including many new offices. It is interesting to note the 
strategy and terms by which land is acquired for these ‘public purposes’, as compared to the 
previously discussed acquisition of land by investors.  
 
Box 9.  Losing land to ‘public interest’ projects 
When in December 2006 the final decision was made to create a new district, the government had to 
find a suitable location for the new district government’s offices. As Waikabul had already been 
designated as the capital of the district the offices needed to be in or close to Waikabul. This area is 
within the traditional domain Anakalang. The first (temporary) district head of Central Sumba, as well 
as the second (elected) district head were both noblemen from this traditional domain. In traditional 
terms, their status was so high that they could simply use their authority and relationships to allocate 
part of the land for this public purpose. However, their traditional leadership was not uncontested, 
and as heads of the (modern) state government, they were also expected to at least consider the 
payment of compensation to the clan whose land it was. Eventually, an area south of the capital that 
had been a contested area for centuries was chosen. The area of 110 ha was located amongst paddy 
fields and was actually a swamp. Some members of the surrounding population say it is an area of the 
spirits (karamat) where no human activities should take place; others that it is an area vulnerable to 
lightning. Others trace the status of the land back to a dispute between several forefathers over who 
was most entitled to occupy the land. The temporary and the recently elected district head together 
organized a ceremony – preceded the night before with an adat ritual – in which the three main 
kabihu of the area offered the land to the government. There was no public information about 
whether there would be a transfer of money from the government to the clans or their leaders.  
 
Another related consequence of the creation of a new district was the increase in sales of land 
between fellow community members in the capital of Central Sumba, Waibakul. Because of the 
sudden influx of money and government officials, and the corresponding increase in purchasing 
                                                
42 J.D.N. Versluys (1941), Aanteekeningen omtrent geld- en goederenverkeer in West-Soemba. In Koloniale 
Studiën (25). pp. 433-83. 
43 BPS-Statistics Indonesia, BAPPENAS and UNDP National Human Development Report 2004: The Economics of 
Democracy: Financing Human development in Indonesia, p. 60. See http://www.undp.or.id/pubs/ihdr2004/ihdr 
2004_full.pdf (last accessed on March 13, 2009). 
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power, many newly assigned government officials needed land for building a house. Having for 
several years anticipated these developments, people had started purchasing strategically located 
land, close to the main road and to offices. As elsewhere in Indonesia, the same forces exclude the 
poor from these locations.45  
 The third aspect of regional 
autonomy that has had direct 
consequences for the development of the 
local land market, and thus for land 
disputes, is the district’s government active 
search for private sector investments in the 
district, particularly in the agricultural 
sector.  
 
4.2 Linking rural Sumba to global markets 
The world-wide processes of agrarian 
change that have taken place (and are 
continuing to do so) as a consequence of 
globalization also have affected the rural 
areas of Sumba. For example, in August 
2007 a headline in the national newspaper Kompas reported that a Swedish company would invest 
one trillion Rupiah in a plantation for producing energy crops (biofuels) in Central Sumba.46 The 
stakeholders are no longer just the local population and government; these plans also involve 
international companies and national intermediaries. The negotiations over land – and possible land 
disputes – deal with tens of thousands of hectares at once.  
 District governments in Sumba applaud these developments, actively seeking investors and 
companies to start agribusiness activities.
47
 These activities can lift the rural economy, creating 
employment for the rural population and making land that was not cultivated economically 
productive. Governments are also keen to receive the taxes and levies these companies will pay, 
since each district must reach a certain level of locally generated income (pendapatan asli daerah) to 
legitimise their autonomous status.   
 Stimulating investment in the rural sector is also in line with national policies of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government, since he was elected in 2005. Presidential regulation No 5 
of 2006 made cultivation of biofuel crops part of the national energy policy. The new investment law 
(Law No 25 of 2007) facilitated foreign investment in the agribusiness sector by shortening 
procedures, providing tax incentives and extending the maximum period for which a company could 
hold a land lease (hak guna usaha, HGU) to 90 years. 
 The downside of these rapid developments is that commercialization of agriculture and 
further commoditization of the rural areas creates dependency on the world market, and 
dependency on companies that supply agricultural inputs and often have ample opportunities to 
create local monopsonies.
48
 Farmers in Sumba have already experienced problems of this kind with 
many crops, especially vanilla and shellac (kutulak). These two commodities had a few boom-years, 
in which prices were high and people could make money fast and easily. Then both markets 
                                                
45 Tristam Moeliono, forthcoming, PhD dissertation. Leiden: Van Vollenhoven Institute. 
46 Kompas, August 16, 2007, see http://www2.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0708/16/daerah/3765820.htm (last 
accessed on May 19, 2009). 
47 See also the website of the Investment Coordination Board (BKPM): 
http://www.bkpm.go.id/index.php/main/content/81 (last accessed on May 19, 2009) and Marcus Colchester, 
Norman Jiwan, Andiko, Martua Sirait, Asep Yunan Firdaus, A. Surambo and Herbert Pane (2006). Promised 
Land: Palm Oil and Land Acquisition in Indonesia – Implications for Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples. 
Bogor: Forest Peoples Programme, Sawit Watch, HuMA and ICRAF.  p. 51. See http://www.forest 
peoples.org/documents/asia_pacific/bases/indonesia.shtml (last accessed on May 19, 2009). 
48 Monopsony is a market with only one buyer.  
Photo 1. The new district government’s office under 
construction in February 2009 (photo by J. Vel). 
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collapsed, totally beyond the control of local producers. In this background of changing 
circumstances, the local population in Sumba sees their land occupied by (international) companies.  
  
The next three sections describe cases in which large areas of land were claimed for commercial 
exploitation. Initially we thought these all concerned land conflicts. Yet, in-depth interviews showed 
us that there was a more elaborate pattern of stakeholder interests, and that for some of the ‘poor 
and disadvantaged’ involved, their main goal may not be obtaining access to land but rather access 
to income-generating opportunities, and their main barrier their lack of decision making power 
within the process. The elaborate description of customary land tenure and social stratification in 
Section 3 must be kept in mind when reading about the new developments in the next three cases.  
 
4.3 Negotiating the terms of a biofuel company’s land use in Central Sumba 
In 2007, representatives of the company PT Cecilisarah Abadi from Jakarta came to Central Sumba to 
start the process of establishing a jatropha plantation in this district.49 According to the interim 
district head of this new district, Umbu Saga Anakaka,50 he had provided the company a temporary 
permit, because it had already arranged permits from higher levels in the bureaucracy. The district 
government encourages large investments in agriculture that will develop the district’s economy and 
yield government income.  However, it expects companies to implement ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ by undertaking a number of (actually state) activities, like building roads and providing 
electricity. In 2007, many other plantation companies entered the area to do feasibility studies, and 
usually they would disappear again, leaving the impression that their studies had a negative result.51 
PT Cecilisarah liked the area south of Central Sumba’s capital town Waibakul, where they were told 
that a large acreage of uncultivated land was available. Part of this area was land in the village (desa) 
Tana Modu. This land was not as empty as it seemed, especially according to the local population, 
who already had some experience with cultivating jatropha. 
 The West Sumba government’s Agricultural Service had been promoting jatropha cultivation 
since 2005, following the national policy to stimulate production of energy crops. In Tana Modu, 
farmers were urged to plant jatropha on an area that in 1992 had been turned into a cashew 
plantation.52 Before 1992, the land was not used for agriculture, but it was part of the grazing land 
used by the local population for their livestock. At the start of the cashew project, the land was 
registered with the National Land Agency and participating farmers had received land certificates. In 
2005, the Agricultural Service sent large tractors to prepare the land for jatropha cultivation and to 
clear all remaining cashew trees. Afterwards the farmers were expected to plant and care for the 
jatropha themselves, and  every three or four months they received herbicides to clear weeds. When 
we interviewed members of this group in November 2007, they told us they did not have information 
about the herbicide or how to apply it safely. They did not have information about current prices of 
jatropha seeds, nor about who would be willing to buy their crop. One farmer brought a bag with 
jatropha seeds to town, where he received only 500 Rupiah (0.06 US $) per kilogram. This did not 
even cover the costs of his transport to town and back. The farmers in Tana Modu were thus not 
motivated to continue this cultivation, which explains the poor condition of their jatropha fields in 
November 2007. 
 The farmers in Tana Modu were organized in a farmers association, in cooperation with a 
local NGO. In November 2007, the chairman of their association told us they had recently received a 
                                                
49 This is a plantation and oil palm processing company active in Banten, West Java. See http://biofuel.indonet 
work.or.id/profile/pt-cecilisarah-abadi.htm (last accessed March 27, 2009), with ‘Jatropha Plantation now 
operating in Eastern Indonesia, seeking investors to expand to 300, 000 hectares’. See http://www.alibaba 
.com/member/gbatchelor/aboutus.html (last accessed on March 27, 2009). 
50 Interview Jacqueline Vel with Umbu Saga Anakaka, November 2007. 
51 One elaborate feasibility study was done  for Indonesia – including Sumba - by GFA Consulting group for the 
German KfW Entwicklungsbank with the title ‘Development of Jatropha Curcas Oil for Bio-Energy in Rural 
Areas’.  
52 Field visit to Tana Modu and interviews with chairman and some members of the Tana Modu  farmers’ group  
were conducted in November 2007 and February 2009. 
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visit from PT Cecilisarah Abadi, accompanied by their American investor, and a local supporter who 
intended to run as candidate in the September 2008 district head elections. The investor set his 
hopes on the present jatropha fields, and offered the farmers a price of 110 US $ (1 million Rupiah) 
per hectare for a whole period of 25 years. The farmers felt strong with their land certificates and 
rejected this offer. According to the interim district head, all decisions regarding jatropha plantations 
should be included in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between three parties: the 
government, the local producers/landowners and the company. However, a sound procedure that 
would ensure these MoUs provided protection for the interests of the local producers was not yet 
available. 
 In April 2008, a ‘coordinating meeting’ was held as part of the procedure for granting a 
location permit to PT Cecilisarah. The director of the company, with one staff member, eleven state 
officials from Waibakul and two officials of the National Land Agency in West Sumba were present, 
as well as fourteen local leaders (tokoh masyarakat) and the village heads of the four villages (desa) 
on which the plantation was planned. The minutes of the meeting do not report any discussion, 
except that the document mentions ‘other interests’ in the land: that the local population uses it as 
grazing land for livestock, and that part of the land had already been registered for local people, 
some with certified ownership. Nevertheless, the permit (izin lokasi) was issued on 2 May 2007 
through a letter containing formal decision No 46 of 2008 of the district head of Central Sumba. That 
permit implied that the company could make preparations for starting a plantation: make a plant 
nursery, obtain land from the local population, negotiate an agreement with them and conduct an 
environmental assessment.  
 When we visited Tana Modu again in February 2009, there had been some progress. There 
were two nurseries, and a field of about two hectares had just been planted with jatropha. The 
members of the farmers group argued that they did not want to lease their land. They thought the 
amount of money offered was just a symbolic gift to underline good relations (uang sirih pinang), as 
would have been appropriate according to adat (see Section 3.3.5). The farmers group thought this 
was by no means fair compensation for offering such a large acreage of land. The company 
representative, on the other hand, argued that they would provide employment opportunities for 
the local population. However, the landowners said they did not intend to work as plantation 
labourers. They wanted to get rewarded as landowners, preferably in a profit (and risk) sharing 
arrangement with the company.  
Local people who would be willing to 
work as plantation labourers seemed absent 
in all of these negotiations. They could be 
indirectly affected by these developments, 
since the uncultivated lands are traditionally 
accessible to low status community members 
when their superiors within the clan allow 
them to open up a field to grow their own 
food. When part of this reservoir is occupied 
by a plantation, land will become scarcer. 
Further, if negotiations between landowners 
(not the poorest people) and the company 
were to fail and the company withdrew, it 
could mean the loss of employment 
opportunities for the landless.  
 
This case of the jatropha plantation in Tana Modu is still in the planning or exploration phase. The 
next section describes a plantation with a longer history, for which there is more information on the 
way land was acquired. 
 
 
Photo 2.  PT Cecilisarah jatropha nursery in Tana Modu 
shows progress in February 2009 (photo by J. Vel). 
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4.4 Dispute prevention regarding a cotton plantation in East Sumba 
In February 2009, the cotton and maize plantation PT Ade Agro Industry (AAI) was already in 
operation in East Sumba. The national government supports the development of this type of 
agribusiness in order to reduce the country’s dependence on imported cotton.53 AAI, an affiliate of 
textile company PT Adetex in Bandung, started operations in East Sumba in 2006. The company 
cooperates with investors from Australia, and with Australian Seed breeding research institutions like 
the Cotton Research and Development Centre (CRDC).54  
 AAI has three plantations in East Sumba, located on the flat plains along the east coast: the 
first, and at around 6000 hectares the largest, is situated in Laipori (sub-district Pandawai), a second 
in Ngohung (sub-district Kahaungu Eti) and a third in La Wila (sub-district Pahunga Lodu). In February 
2009, the only plantation that was operational was in Laipori.55 According to the chairman of PT 
Adetex, Tjahyadi, ‘the company utilizes marginal land for the cotton plantations in East Sumba, and 
the plantations are expected to turn out 1.8 tons of cotton per hectare annually’.
56
  
 In February 2009, AAI had not yet completed the whole legal procedure for starting a 
plantation. It had not yet been granted  cultivation rights (Hak guna usaha)  or building rights for the 
necessary offices.  All it had was a formal district head’s decision (Surat Keputusan Bupati), which 
apparently served as a temporary permit for their operations. Further, the environmental 
assessment had not yet been conducted. Despite not having secured all the legal authorisations, the 
company already started operations. In 2007 and 2008 they grew a mixture of maize and cotton on 
90 hectares, and used four hectares for trials of different varieties of cotton and maize seeds.
57
 The 
yield for cotton was 6 to 7 ton per hectare and the harvest was shipped to PT Adetex in Bandung. 
 The plain in Laipori where the plantation is now located used to be ‘empty’ land used by  
local people for herding livestock. Most people who live close to this plantation site are Savunese, an 
ethnic group originating from the nearby island Savu. When in 2005 the company’s first plans 
became public, there was protest among the local population, directed at the district government. 
They argued that the land was clan land (tanah suku), but had no strong evidence to support their 
arguments: no clear history of clan ownership, no land certificates, just the common practice of 
herding their animals.58 Nevertheless, the district government and the company organised a meeting 
aimed at preventing further escalation of the conflict. They chose the local church as the venue and 
addressed all invitees as brothers and sisters within the Christian family. The owner of PT Adetex in 
Bandung happened to be Christian himself. A church is a house of worship, where people are not 
supposed to argue with each other, and therefore it was an excellent place for conflict prevention. 
The government and company representatives addressed the audience, saying that the plantation 
would bring economic prosperity to the region.  They argued that higher incomes would also benefit 
the church and the quality of the congregation. In a second meeting, also in the church, the company 
gave the congregation cloth to make new cloths for the reverend, and promised providing free bus 
transportation for schoolchildren. The protest faded out. 
In the second location, Ngohung, the situation was different. 59 Around 75 land certificates, 
each covering one to two hectares, had already been issued in respect of the land in question before 
the arrival of AAI These certificates were issued in the 1980s, when a company (Balai Anakardia) 
wanted to start a cashew plantation. Obtaining land certificates was one of the preconditions for the 
company getting a bank loan. The company went on to plant cashew trees, but the plantation failed. 
                                                
53 At the moment Indonesia imports almost its entire cotton requirement - around 560,000 tons of cotton a 
year - to feed its cotton yarn factories.  
54 http://ditjenbun.deptan.go.id/semusimbun/semusim/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=137& 
Itemid=37 (last accessed May 23, 2009). 
55 We visited this plantation on February 4, 2009. Interview with Stuart Grey, plantation manager. 
56 http://www.yarnsandfibers.com/news/index_fullstory.php3?id=12435&section=33&country=Indonesia&p_ty 
pe=Cotton (last accessed on March 23, 2009). 
57 http://www.indomedia.com/poskup/2008/08/04/edisi04/humba.htm. 
58 Interview with Umbu Tamu, local advisor to the director of PT Ade Agro, Waingapu February 6, 2009. 
59 Interview with local herdsman and a Village Head living close to the Laipori plantation site, February 4, 2009. 
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Several reasons were suggested for this failure: lack of water, the local habit of burning fields60, lack 
of care for the crop, or simply that the area was not suitable. With the failure of the plantation, the 
local farmers stopped cultivating cashew. When, 20 years later, AAI entered the area with plans to 
establish their plantation on the same location, the locals who felt they owned the land feared their 
land would be occupied by the company, and discussed protest among themselves. AAI’s local 
director – a retired high government official in East Sumba, who also acted as mediator between the 
local population and the company in Laipora’s church meeting – heard about the protest and took 
the initiative to bring the protestors to East Sumba’s district head to discuss the issue. They accepted, 
and were received by the district head, who was a descendant of one of East Sumba’s main rajas. 
Most of the people who held a land certificate for the location in Ngohung were Savunese. Appealing 
to their ethnic identity, the district head addressed the protesters as members of the ethnic group 
that, during the era of warfare in Sumba, cooperated with his own forefathers to prevent external 
enemies from invading Sumba. In this way, he made the protestors feel that they had a special 
connection to the district head, and afterwards they easily accepted his offer to give them another 
parcel of land as compensation. He proposed that the protestors themselves would indicate which 
parcel they would like. According to the mediator who gave us this information, all were satisfied 
with the result of this meeting.  
It seemed like the protestors did not actually care particularly about the land.  Rather, their 
protest was inspired by the hope that they could get financial compensation from the company (or 
wealthy investors who they associated with the plantation company). Actually, their claims were not 
very strong. As ethnic Savunese, the only basis upon which they could make a land claim was long 
term land use. The company did not offer financial compensation, but offered opportunities for 
(casual) labour at the minimum wage for agricultural labourers in the region. Initially, some people 
took this opportunity. But recently, many labourers decided they no longer wanted to work at the 
plantation, because wages were not paid regularly, people were only employed seasonally as casual 
labourers, and they felt they could earn more in other places in Indonesia. One reason for the poor 
labour conditions and wages was that in February 2009, the plantation appeared to be experiencing 
financing difficulties.61 The global economic crisis had repercussions for the Indonesian textile 
industry, and since AAI is a subsidiary of Pt Adetex, it suffered flow on effects.62  
When we interviewed the local village head, he told us that very recently the issue about the 
land certificates had re-emerged. A candidate in the upcoming elections for regional parliament (to 
be held in April 2009) was promising the holders of certificates that he would defend their interests. 
However, local commentators dismissed this initiative as primarily a strategy to gain support for his 
own election campaign.  
 
4.5 Killing protest against a mining company  
This last case is an extreme example of what can happen when people who believe that an external 
party has compromised their access to vital resources – in this case to land and clean water – give 
voice to their claim and engage in protest.63 The core problem in this case is collusion between a 
mining company and the local customary chief, Umbu Yadar, who is one of the wealthiest livestock 
owners in East Sumba, and manages a number of businesses in the district capital.  
In 2005, PT Artha Sumba (PTAS) started lead mining operations in East Sumba, in 
collaboration with Shen-Zhen Oxin Resource from Southern China. PTAS had appointed Umbu Yadar 
as local director. Umbu Yadar was the traditional ruler in the area Nggongi, in the southern interior of 
East Sumba, where mining operations would take place. Although it only had a permit for 
exploration, the company started mining. The district government allowed the company to use 240 
                                                
60 Traditionally, at the end of the dry season the uncultivated fields are burnt to clear old and dry vegetation, so 
that new fresh grass and weeds will grow with the start of the rainy season. 
61 Information from Village Head Ngohung and former employees. 
62 http://www.yarnsandfibers.com/news/index_fullstory.php3?id=17714. 
63 Based on interview with staff members of NGO KOPPESDA in Waingapu, February 6, 2009 and additional 
information from newspapers. 
Van Vollenhoven Institute  Access to Justice in Indonesia  
Leiden University  Working Paper Series: Land 
 27 
hectares of land within the borders of Wanggameti National Park for their mining operations. In April 
2006, one thousand tonnes of lead ore was exported from this area to China, and local newspapers 
reported that, upon learning of the exports, the district parliament (DPRD) objected, as the permit 
had been issued for exploration only.64 
People living in the mining area saw that the company could freely enter part of the national 
park, while their own claims to this land – being the original inhabitants of the area – were rejected 
on the basis that the forest was protected. The chairwomen of one of the NGOs that had been 
working on issues relating to the national park told us that of the 18 villages involved in negotiations 
concerning the national park, two villages were particularly hard to communicate with, and these 
were the villages in Umbu Yadar’s territory.  People from this territory started protesting in 2005, 
when some of the rivers in the area fell dry, and some people living close to the mining area started 
suffering skin diseases after using river water that they said had been polluted by the mining 
operations. Local protest was led by Umbu M (UM), one of Umbu Yadar’s clan relatives of similar 
nobility status, but far less wealthy. UM voiced the protest through a petition signed by 17 
community members and addressed to the company. A copy of the petition was sent to NGOs active 
in the national park area, and the organizations in their network. Before the protest could evolve into 
a dispute, protestors found that someone had killed their livestock. They also feared their houses 
would be burnt, knowing that both types of violence were traditional ways of putting opponents 
under pressure. Similar events occurred in 2004 to some of Umbu Yadar’s political opponents, who 
did not support his favourite candidate in the district head elections. Afraid of losing their livestock 
and houses, many protestors withdrew from the action. There was discussion about the signatures 
on the petition, with some saying that people who withdrew were still on the list, accusing UM of 
forgery. 
When, in 2006, a company truck picked up bags of lead ore for export, some locals threw 
stones and damaged the truck. The police caught a group of 15 men, including UM. He was 
summoned to court and accused of criminal offences, whereas the original protest  was not 
discussed. UM was sentenced to two years in prison, along with other members of his group. 
In July 2006, the district head summoned the company to stop operations immediately until 
they had completed the mandatory environmental assessment, showing that the operations would 
do no harm to the environment. Although Umbu Yadar did not give permission for NGOs to work 
with the people in ‘his territory’, protest against mining in this area, and particularly in the national 
park, continued and was strengthened by the establishment of two community based organizations, 
Kelompok Masayarakat Pelestarian Hutan and Forum Andali Luku Pala.  
 
4.6 Access to justice for the poor in these three cases 
One similarity between these three cases is that, for many of the justice seekers mentioned,  the 
process of getting access to justice did not seem to progress further than the phase of voicing claims 
based on grievances. The landowners in Central Sumba had not been given an opportunity to 
negotiate further with the plantation company about the terms on which the land would be used for 
jatropha cultivation. The certificate holders in Ngohung, who protested against the cotton plantation 
company using their land, seemed satisfied with the resolution offered by the district head, being the 
granting of (symbolic) compensation by way of alternative parcels of land. This solution could be 
regarded as successful redress of their grievance. However, it can also be interpreted as a withdrawal 
of a legitimate claim by a disadvantaged group under pressure from the powerful local elite. A similar 
situation was experienced by protesters in the third case. Those who did not withdraw, and 
continued voicing their claims against the mining company, ended up entangled in the justice sector.  
However, this engagement with justice processes was not a means by which the justice seekers could 
seek redress for the injustices they experienced, but rather a means by which the company advanced 
its own interests against the justice seekers. 
                                                
64 ‘Ekspor timah hitam, DPRD belum tahu’. Pos Kupang, April 30, 2006. See 
http://www.indomedia.com/poskup/ 2006/05/01/edisi01/0105hum1.htm (last accessed on March 31, 2009). 
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The second similarity between the cases is that the poorest or most disadvantaged are 
largely absent, or at least not the main actors. In the first case, the poorest were probably not the 
landowners who negotiated with the plantation company, but the people who actually work on the 
land, and might have been interested in getting employment as plantation labourers. In the second 
case, the local population of Savunese origin could be regarded as the poor: on the first site, they did 
not even have sound arguments to support their claims, while on the second site, they held 
ownership certificates which did not provide actual security of tenure. Without the ability to make a 
strong adat claim, a person in Sumba cannot easily fight a land dispute. In the third case, the extreme 
power differences between the local ruler and the poor in his area seemed to prevent any of the 
poor people’s real life problems from evolving into claims and disputes. 
The third similarity between the cases is that local elite seemed to be able to determine the 
solutions. It seems clear that a person’s choice of redress mechanisms expands in line with his or her 
capital (all forms). The next section discusses the role played by various forums in solving land 
disputes in Sumba.  
 
 
5. Redress mechanisms for solving land conflicts 
 
Three central questions about redress mechanisms should be asked in relation to the cases described 
in the preceding section. First, which redress mechanisms were used in these three cases? Second, 
what is the range of redress mechanisms available in Sumba, in what type of land disputes are they 
used by justice seekers, and why? Third, what factors limit access for the poor to redress 
mechanisms? 
 
5.1 Redress mechanisms in the three cases 
In the first case, a dispute is yet to actually evolve. The type of forum that is required in this phase (a 
developing conflict) is an impartial institution that can facilitate the negotiations between all 
stakeholders. The ‘coordinating meeting’ that was organized by the government, meetings organized 
by the farmers group, and meetings organised by the company each set the agenda according to 
their own party’s priorities. How to include the poorest of the local population in the negotiations, 
and give recognition to their interests, is another challenge. According to adat, leaders should 
properly represent their subordinates. However, in this case the interests of the landowners (who 
are also the leaders) are not the same as the interests of non-landowning members of the 
community who rely on their labour for a living. 
 In the second case, the mediator hired by the company to facilitate smooth communication 
with the local population and the government, effectively repressed or eliminated protests before 
they could evolve into land claims. The first ‘redress mechanism’ was the forum provided by the local 
church congregation. The mediator used religious affiliation to connect the parties, and incorporated 
religious norms in his speech to undermine the legitimacy of protest. In the second location, where 
local farmers held land certificates, he directed protestors to the district head. As the district 
government is in favour of large scale economic activities, its concern was to prevent conflicts that 
might obstruct such activities. The district head used his position as Sumbanese adat chief, 
employing adat rhetorical techniques to construct connectors between the protestors and himself, 
and in so doing tried convincing the protestors to trust him and accept his leadership. Relocation 
(replacing the land needed for the plantation by parcels elsewhere) is a solution that resembles the 
process by which the lord of the land (mangu tana) could, in the past, divide land amongst the clans 
and their members.  
 In the third case, the protestors did not really get access to a redress mechanism. They filed a 
petition, and made the grievances they voiced in the petition available to NGOs. However, it appears 
that there was no mechanism that could protect them from (the threat of) violence, and we have no 
information as to why they did not report the killing of their livestock to the police. However, this 
case appears to have indirectly contributed to strengthening farmers organizations in the areas 
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surrounding the national park. In the future, those organisations may be able to improve the access 
for non-elite community members to redress mechanisms. 
 
5.2 Available mechanisms: dispute resolution pyramid 
In this section, we compare the availability of redress mechanisms in these real situations with the 
repertoire that should be available according to law,
65
 and ask whether there are any other redress 
mechanisms available, and when they are used. We explored this question by interviewing several 
key informants: the chairman of the General State Court in Waikabubak, the head of the Legal 
Bureau of the district government in Central Sumba, experienced in land dispute resolution because 
he had been a long serving secretary of a sub-district head (sub-district head) , several village heads, 
a reverend, staff members of four NGOs, and several people who were involved in land disputes 
either as litigants or accused. 
The general picture of dispute resolution regarding land issues in Sumba is depicted in Figure 
1 as a pyramid. This metaphor was chosen by Millar and Sarat, who place grievances at the base of 
the pyramid, with the small proportion of the grievances that evolve into legal disputes filed in court 
at the top.
 66
 
 
Figure 1. Land dispute resolution pyramid in Sumba 
 
 
The large majority of land disputes in Sumba are settled through deliberation ‘within the family’ 
(secara keluarga). This is regarded as the normal way to settle land conflicts between members of 
the same clan, and between members of affiliated clans. 
The next layer in the pyramid is consultation with the village head. This option may be used 
where settling within the family does not result in a satisfying solution, or where the parties do not 
share a common kinship, which makes adat hard to apply. 
The sub-district head functions as a forum within which to appeal the decisions of village 
heads in his sub-district. The sub-district head is also the forum for resolving land disputes in which 
                                                
65 Here we use parts of the RolGom model described in the Conceptual study on Rule of Law and access to 
Justice as a methodological tool. 
66 Richard E. Millar and Austin Sarat (1980/81). Grievances, claims and disputes: assessing the adversary 
culture. In Law and Society Review (15:3-4). p. 545. 
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the village head is a party, or is otherwise not impartial. The sub-district head’s office also handles 
cases of land conflict between inhabitants of two different villages (desa).  
Neither the village head nor the sub-district head belong to the judiciary, and in land dispute 
settlements they function as mediators rather than adjudicators. Their ‘decisions’ are in fact better 
regarded as advice to the contesting parties on how to settle their dispute.  If accepted by the 
parties, the settlement can either be ceremonially accepted (slaughtering a pig and having a shared 
meal) or confirmed in a document signed by both parties. The chairman of the General Court told us 
that village or sub-district level dispute settlement written contracts should be sent to and filed by 
the General State Court, thus giving them  stronger legal status. However, this is not yet common 
practice.    
According one informant (the sub-district head’s long-serving secretary), three quarters of 
the disputes handled by the sub-district head in Central Sumba concern land conflicts. Of all land 
disputes that occur on the island, very few are handled by the General State Court. This court is the 
fourth option, generally used only after the other three steps have failed to solve the dispute. The 
court always asks for evidence that the parties have tried the three other steps prior to instituting 
formal legal proceedings. Solving land cases is very difficult for the State Court, because written 
evidence is usually not available and witnesses who might be able to testify how the ancestors 
distributed or divided the land are hard to find.67 
As long as the majority of land on Sumba is not registered in parcels, with claims converted 
into rights under the Basic Agrarian Law (No 5 of 1960), adat law will remain the dominant system 
for land governance. Obviously, disputes can arise in circumstances where an individual holds a 
landownership certificate (under state law). However, even in these cases, a litigant often argues 
that this ownership is not legitimate, and such arguments are often derived from adat.  The four 
levels in this pyramid, including the state court, thus all use adat law for settling land disputes.  
When adat law is used, the implicit differentiations between individuals according to gender, 
class and ethnicity become included in the legal system. Further research could investigate whether 
and how people who belong to groups who are disadvantaged under adat law turn to state law as a 
means by which to improve their rights in respect of natural resources such as land.  
 
Two types of land disputes generally come before the court: disputes with (wealthy) businessmen as 
the plaintiff, and disputes that concern an ‘offence of social status’. Box 10 presents an example of 
the second type. 
 
Box 10. Justice for a “rolling stone” 
In one of the main villages in the traditional domain of Lamboya, two cousins, Ande and Dena, had a dispute 
about land. Both were fourth generation descendants of the same forefather, both of noble rank. Ande was a 
Christian religious teacher (guru injil) who had left his kampung several decades ago when the church 
assigned him to work in another part of Sumba. According to Ande’s son, his father had offered the land to 
his relatives for cultivation during his absence. When Ande retired, he returned to his kampong, and lived in 
a temporary house close to his cousin Dena on their forefather’s land. When Ande reasserted his claim to the 
land, Dena proposed to divide it, but Ande refused, arguing that the land was part of his inheritance. There 
was a written document, a will dated from 1937, in which Ande’s father assigned the land to Ande, and this 
will was presented as evidence. A conflict thus arose, and Ande was scolded and offended, being called a 
‘rolling stone’ (lontang lantung).
68
 The conflict escalated to the point that some of Dena’s supporters threw 
stones at Ande’s house, and at this point the police got involved. The village head, the police, and the sub-
district head all tried to resolve the dispute, but each time their solution failed to satisfy Ande and his sons. 
In February 2009, Ande’s son, who is a civil servant in town, instituted legal proceedings against Dena in the 
State Court in Waikabubak. They felt that justice could only be served by the full return of their land.
69
 
                                                
67 Interview with chairman of the General State Court in Waikabubak, February 12, 2009. 
68 The proverb ‘a rolling stone gathers no moss’ means that  people pay a price for being always on the move, 
in that they have no roots in a specific place. Having no roots denies one’s identity in Sumba.  
69 Interview with Ande’s son at the General State Court in Waikabubak when he was there to submit his 
charges, February 12, 2009.  
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At times, members of the district parliament (DPRD) can also become involved in resolving land 
disputes in their capacity as representatives of larger groups. This occurs when land disputes escalate 
to the point of communal conflict between traditional domains, often centred upon an area of 
contested land. In truth, these types of disputes are usually a result of competition between the 
elites from the opposing domains. In 2006, a newspaper article mentioned four unresolved examples 
of such conflict, in whichthe vice chairman of the regional parliament became involved, encouraging 
the village and sub-district heads to act as neutral mediators.
70
 The vice-chairman added that, if 
contesting parties could not come to an agreement, the district government could impose a sanction 
in the form of designating the whole disputed area as a public forest (hutan rakyat), making private 
property claims (including clan claims) impossible.
71
 
In Sumba, many people like to involve the district head as a participant (or actor) in the 
dispute resolution process. District heads are popularly regarded as a general superior or chief-of-
chiefs. By contrast, sub-district heads, who are are seen more as administrative heads , are often 
bypassed by justice seekers. The former district head of East Sumba, Umbu Mehang Kunda, who died 
in 2008, and the current district head of Central Sumba, Umbu Bintang, are examples of district 
heads who reflect the popular view of district leaders. They are sons of traditional kings (rajas), and 
are leaders amongst the landed aristocracy in their districts. Changes to electoral laws in 2004, which 
provided that district heads must be directly elected, have brought these leaders even closer to their 
constituency. Many people do not feel any barriers preventing them from going and visiting their 
district head, preferably at home, and asking for help to solve a dispute.
72
 In these circumstances, the 
district head is implicitly invited (and expected) to use his powers to arrange a solution in any way 
possible. The case of the cotton plantation in Section 4.4 demonstrated how a district head can play 
the role of a superior local leader.  
Yet district heads can also perform as actors in the dispute resolution process in their 
capacity as the local head of the bureaucracy. Box 11 describes a case in which the local elite used 
their connections with the district head to put pressure on a man who was occupying part of their 
land.  
 
Box 11. Good government officials do not encroach  
In 1980, for the first time in history, the Agricultural Service (Dinas Agraria) registered and certified 
land in village L in the East Sumbanese domain Mangili. Certificate number 1 belonged to Umbu T from 
clan Hadapa. In 2000, a dispute over this land arose when a member from another clan, who had 
already made a garden on part of the land, built a house on it.
73
 Shortly before, the area in which the 
contested parcel was located became strategically important when the government implemented 
road construction programs, so that the contested land was suddenly right beside the main road to 
the capital town. Both parties had arguments based on past transactions, and on histories of the land 
that were linked to their own forefathers. Since the disputants were closely related through marriage, 
the dispute should have been solved within the family, but none of the proposed solutions led to a 
satisfactory outcome. The dispute faded, especially after both disputants had died, in 2004 and 2005. 
In 2008, one of the encroacher’s sons, Medy, who worked as the sub-district head’s secretary, built his 
own house on the contested land. The children of clan Hadapa took action in January 2009. They felt 
100 percent sure of their claims to the land both in terms of adat law and state law (they held the 
landownership certificate for the land). However, the problem was enforcement. The Hadapa clan 
members submitted a letter to the district head asking him to correct Medy’s behaviour.  This was 
seen as the appropriate course of action due to Medy’s position as a government official within the 
district head’s district. Clan Hadapa’s argument was that ‘a good government official should obey the 
                                                
70 ‘Kades jangan jadi biang sengketa tanah’. Pos Kupang, May 12, 2006. See www.indomedia.com/ 
poskup/2006/12/05/ edisi05/humba.htm (last accessed on August 10, 2007). 
71 idem, ‘seluruh lokasi yang menjadi sengketa dijadikan hutan rakyat’ 
72 This was also noticed in the Justice for the Poor case study ‘Sumba: groundwork for Legal reform’, 
September 2001, Jakarta: World Bank. p.8. 
73 See section 3 for the Sumbanese perceptions of differences between land ‘for growing your own food’ and 
land for residential purposes. 
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law’, and they added that shortly after sending the letter they planned to start destroying Medy’s 
house. The letter was not just signed by Umbu T’s children, but also by fellow clan members, making 
the case a matter of broader principle rather than a single dispute. The district head responded in 
February 2009 by asking his first assistant
74
 to handle the case. At the time of writing (August 2009) 
the disputants were still waiting for the first assistant to act.  
 
NGO staff are also often involved in dispute resolution. In the case in Section 4.3, an NGO motivated 
the farmers in Tana Modu to set up their own farmers association. As a result, their group bargaining 
power in relation to the plantation company has markedly increased. In the third case, concerning 
mining activities, NGOs morally supported the protestors, had a role in bringing the dispute process 
before the media, and encouraged the formation of a farmers association. NGOs in Sumba do not 
have the power to solve conflicts, but they can facilitate dispute resolution processes by bringing 
parties together and identifying connectors.  
The church played a role in the second case described in Section 4, where the mediator of 
the plantation company used the church building and the Christian (normative) discourse to 
ideologically undermine protest and prevent escalation of the grievances into a dispute. The church 
provides an effective repertoire of mediation tools in Sumba, because Christianity offers an identity 
that can bridge differences in ethnicity and class.  
 
5.3 Access and barriers for the poor: opposite pyramids 
The factors that determine whether there are barriers to access to justice include lack of knowledge 
about justice institutions and law, geographical distance, and costs of the procedures. In Sumba, all 
of these factors are relevant.  
There are two General State Courts on the island, one in Waingapu and one in Waikabubak. 
Costs of the procedures do not only include official fees and travelling expenditures for the litigant 
and the accused. In Sumba, it is common practice to attend court hearings with a group of 
supporters, similar to attending an adat event, to which people prefer to arrive as part of a 
rombongan adat (adat group). This habit raises costs considerably, as all group members have to eat, 
and a truck or bus is required for transportation. Moreover, it is proper for every phase in the dispute 
resolution process to be finalized with a shared meal with meat – slaughtering a pig is a symbol of 
having reached an agreement.  The costs involved in bringing a case to the State Court can therefore 
be very high, especially for people who reside in remote or less accessible mountain areas.75 
 
The question of access to forums of redress can also be answered in terms of the forms of capital 
theory, as explained in Section 2.3. In Sumba, some degree of each of the forms of capital is required 
in order to win a land dispute. The first is knowledge about adat, and skill in the politics of 
negotiation and in phrasing arguments – this traditional knowledge includes knowledge of the past 
and of ritual speech. Second is knowledge about state law and state institutions, for example an 
understanding of how to get a landownership certificate. Social capital helps disputants to arrange 
the right type of support, and to shorten procedures. In terms of support, having a large group of 
supporters seems to assist in converting disputes that are actually between individuals into disputes 
about group interests. Boxes 4 and 10 provide examples of this strategy. Cultural capital, especially 
one’s position in the hierarchy of adat, is important because according to adat it is connected to 
decision making power . Finally, economic capital is necessary to pay all the costs involved.  
 The more capital an individuals hold, the greater their access to and choice of forms of 
redress. In Sumba, it seems that choice of forum is not always linked to the type of land dispute. 
Although informal deliberations would seem to be more appropriate in a case in which brothers have 
a dispute, they might instead fight each other in court, provided they have the means, the knowledge 
and can mobilise sufficient support to be sure that a decision in their favour would be socially 
                                                
74 ‘Surat disposisi kepada asisten 1’. 
75 One informant told us her experience that a land case in court had cost around Rp. 50 million, including all 
formal and informal expenditures. 
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accepted. Figure 2 indicates the relationship between a person’s capital and the breadth of their 
choices in terms of redress mechanisms, showing that the poor generally only have access to 
deliberation within the family, whereas people with a large amount of capital can settle their dispute 
in court. 
 
Figure 2. Relation between choice of dispute regulation mechanism and amount of various forms 
of capital. 
 
 
Estimated amount of disputes settled through 
indicated mechanism 
 
Indication of amount of capital held by 
plaintiff 
 
As depicted in Figure 2, the opposite is true as well: lack of all forms of capital means limited, or 
no, access to justice. Access to justice for the poor, even in the restricted sense of access to the 
justice system, is thus not only a matter of lack of legal awareness that can be solved with legal 
empowerment. It is also a lack of social, cultural and economic capital. It follows logically then 
that only a comprehensive programme, addressing all these aspects of poverty, can effectively 
improve access to justice. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The central question addressed in this case study is whether and how the poor and 
disadvantaged in Central and East Sumba  have access to redress mechanisms when the land 
that they cultivate or on which they live becomes contested, particularly in the context of 
commercialization of agriculture. 
 
A first cluster of conclusions concerns the functioning of adat and the internal definition of being 
poor and disadvantaged. Sumbanese society is hierarchical, and the poor and disadvantaged are 
those at the bottom of that hierarchy. Although state law does purport to regulate land in some 
respects, adat is the main legal system that governs land issues in Sumba. In effect, this means 
that individuals can often claim land according to their position within the adat system, including 
their social rank, clan membership, marital status and gender. Individuals are not equal in adat 
law.  
In Sumbanese adat, land rights generally only accrue to men. Men of the lowest 
traditional social rank (the traditional slave class) cannot own land; they only have access to 
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their master’s land. Men who do not belong to the land owning clans, for example people from 
outside ethnic groups like Savunese, can only temporarily borrow land from ethnic Sumbanese.  
Adat is not codified. Adat priests have the authority of the deified ancestors to recall the 
ways of the past, which include the rules concerning land. These rules are not written, nor fixed 
in any other way, so there is ample room for negotiation and adaptation of the rules to new 
circumstances. Adat rules are meant to be phrased in ritual speech, which requires specialised  
skill that takes years to acquire. This type of traditional legal knowledge is decreasing, and the 
most modern families have difficulty in getting their adat ceremonies performed.  
Social acceptance of the adat rules is based on an acceptance of the authority of those 
who set the rules. This is becoming a problem for several reasons. First, most Sumbanese are 
now Christians, and no longer adhere to the traditional ancestral religion. The fact that people 
no longer believe in the power of the ancestors’ spirits places the validity of adat rules under 
pressure. Second, many Sumbanese who have enjoyed higher (modern) education find it hard to 
accept the authority of their adat priests and elders, who often have far less education and live 
in the village in circumstances of relative poverty. Third, state law and other secular institutions 
provide alternatives to adat law in the form of state officials and church or NGO leaders.  
 
A second set of conclusions concerns injustices due to the commoditization of land. When 
agribusiness or mining companies enter an area, the consequences for the poorest groups, and 
for landowners are likely to be different. The poorest might benefit from the employment 
opportunities that accompany the development of an agribusiness project. Their stake in 
negotiations with the plantation company concerns labour conditions and wages. By contrast, 
landowners usually do not want to become labourers on their own land, and therefore tend to 
resist the establishment of plantation projects. Their main interests are to ensure that their land 
rights are recognised, and that they receive a sufficient return on their land. 
 The hierarchical structure of Sumbanese society, in combination with the power of the 
political class, creates the context in which large land transactions become matters dealt with by 
companies, district governments and local adat chiefs, to the exclusion of less powerful groups. 
The companies and district governments, whose interests are usually aligned, often co-opt  
these chiefs by offering them salaried positions or treating them as the local population’s 
representatives who are entitled to receive compensation payments for their whole clan. The 
landowners, who are excluded from these negotiations for big projects, do not have access to 
any redress mechanism that might hear their grievances and deal appropriately with them. 
Further, there are not yet any NGOs working in Sumba to assist the landless in protecting their 
rights as labourers. 
 
A third conclusion is that the district head has a pivotal role in providing justice for the poor by 
protecting their sources of livelihood and economic opportunities. The district head has the legal 
authority to enforce decisions concerning land use – both in relation to companies as well as in 
relation to the local population – while the district government issues location permits, and has 
the authority to include conditions for the protection of the interests of the local population, 
including the poor and disadvantaged.  
 
A final conclusion is that the implementation of state law rather than adat in the area of land 
governance would benefit the poor and disadvantaged in Sumba. Examples from this case study 
are: (a) limiting the duration for which land can be pledged, (b) registering pledging contracts 
free of charge, (c) developing a comprehensive policy for land reform, registration and titling, 
and protection of local people’s land titles against market forces. Such measures would conflict 
with adat rules and would need careful assessment to minimise unwanted side effects and 
consequences.  However, they would be likely to have a revolutionary impact upon the poor and 
disadvantaged in Sumba. 
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